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Ruling Singapore since Independence in 1965, it is indubitable that the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) has enjoyed uninterrupted political dominance for the last forty 
years. Much literature investigating the nature and source of PAP dominance is 
available, from works describing the economic foundation of its dominance, to 
studies identifying the coercive means available to enforce dominance, to more 
nuanced arguments on the role of ideology and bureaucratization in consolidating 
dominance. However, such works are generally too narrowly focused on the state 
and perhaps as a result center on the dialectic between coercion and consent. I 
argue that such a dialectical focus is too blunt an analytical tool to understand 
current political dynamics in Singapore. Singapore’s economic transformation over 
the years has been accompanied by structural changes such as increasing class 
stratification and greater awareness of relative poverty. As Singapore continues with 
economic restructuring, a small but growing section of the population will experience 
this in terms of tangible material deprivation due to unemployment and job insecurity. 
In order to maintain political dominance in the changing economic and socio-political 
environment, I hypothesize that under the third Prime Minister, we are currently 
seeing a discursive shift to pastoral welfarism and increased grassroots emphasis. 
Using a Foucauldian approach, increasing decentralization of welfare administration 
to grassroots organizations is not seen as a means to control less, but to control 
better. The use of grassroots organizations is a new form of fine-tuned control, a 
reorganization of control conduits that will delve deep into the social body. Thus in 
order to fully understand politics in the 2000s, focus must be not be placed merely on 
the state, but shifted to the links between the state and individuals as well as 
institutions at the grassroots. With this argument another literature gap appears. The 
actual mechanisms of the consolidation and maintenance of political power at the 
ground have been generally neglected by most literature. Most envision the state as 
a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the 
totality, or a class of a group among the citizens.The state’s power lies in its ability 
for what Foucault terms as totalizing and individualizing techniques of control and if 
only totalizing techniques of power are studied, power will be seen as one step 
removed from the practicalities of everyday life and remain a “mysterious” substance 
that escapes critical analysis. Thus, a total picture of how political power operates to 
enforce dominance is largely unavailable. Grassroots organizations with their 
extensive networks affect the lives of many. It is thus important to achieve a more 
detailed picture of these capillary power networks that is presently available. The 
Singapore state has been lauded as a model for other small developing nations to 
emulate. With the potential of both economic as well as political infrastructures being 
replicated in other countries, the consequences of this study have wide-reaching 
implications. 
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1       Introduction 
 
There is certainly no reason for nations to despise peace, but they should not 
be satisfied with that alone. A nation which asks for nothing from the 
government beyond the maintenance of order is already a slave in the bottom 
of its heart. It is a slave to its prosperity, and the road is free for the man (sic) 
to tie the fetters. 
(Tocqueville 2000:540) 
 
Since Independence in 1965, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has enjoyed 
uninterrupted political dominance in Singapore for the last forty years. I argue in this 
thesis that with the change in Prime Minister in 2004, as well as changing social, 
economic and political conditions, the PAP is currently shifting strategies to retain 
and reinforce political dominance.  
Changes in strategies understood as transformations in “styles of 
governance” with leadership succession have been described by many (Rodan 
1992a, Shee 1992, Mutalib 1993, Sikorski 1996, Vasil 2000, Ho 2000). From political 
unrest in the 1960s and early 1970s to massive economic advancements in the late 
1970s to 1980s, the style exemplified by then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was one 
of coercive control which was variously labelled as illiberal democracy (Bell et al 
1995, Mutalib 2002), soft authoritarianism (Roy 1994), consociational democracy 
(Ganesan 1996), non-liberal communitarian democracy (Chua 1995) or Western 
conservatism (Tamney 1995).  
In the 1990s, second-generation PAP leaders with Goh Chok Tong as Prime 
Minister adopted a consultative approach to adjust to a new political environment 
(Heng 1991, Rodan 1992b, Ganesan 1996, Mauzy and Milne 2002). Consultation 
exercises – from Vision ‘99, a “massive ten-month campaign to try to get the views of 
thousands of Singaporeans on the party manifesto” (Rodan 1992a:7), to others such 
as The Next Lap (1991), Singapore 21 (1999) and Remaking Singapore (2003) – 
may be construed as efforts of the government to allow for greater political 
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participation and as part of the process to introduce a more participatory form of 
democracy, one “reflecting the changing needs of modern Singapore” (Rodan 
1992a:5). While little political liberalization has arguably occurred, they tried to forge 
a new consensus with the population, regaining their support with less governmental 
intervention in personal affairs, as well as greater participation and consultation in 
decision-making (Chua 1995:77).   
In 2004, Lee Hsien Loong (Lee) took over as Singapore’s third Prime Minister. 
In his inaugural National Day Rally, Lee introduced wide-ranging policy changes from 
the introduction of five-day work weeks to equal medical benefits for both male and 
female civil servants (National Day Rally Speech 22 August 2004). Barely a year into 
office in July 2005, he introduced a comprehensive welfare scheme called ComCare 
to complement available welfare support that will see the close involvement of 
grassroots organizations in its disbursement. In late 2005, a Ministerial Committee 
on Low-Wage Workers was formed which recommended under the broad approach 
of “Workfare” a host of policy suggestions including a one-off Workfare Bonus. And 
in the 2006 Budget Lee disbursed the Progress Package that redistributed 
government budget surpluses according to income, favoring lower-income workers. 
Under the helm of Singapore’s third Prime Minister, I argue that we are seeing a shift 
in strategy or “governmental style” to one characterized by an increasing emphasis 
on discourses of welfare and grassroots management, which I term as pastoral 
welfarism, to be elaborated in the later chapters.   
Much literature investigating the nature and source of PAP dominance is 
available, from works describing the economic foundation of its dominance (Huff 
1994, Soon and Tan 1997,Low 1998, Mahizhnan and Lee 1998, Asher 2001, Quah 
2001, Tan 2004, Goh 2004, Trocki 2006), to studies identifying the coercive means 
available to enforce dominance (Tremewan 1994, Lingle 1996, Lydgate 2003, 
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Jeyaretnam 2003, Fernandez 2004) to more nuanced arguments on the role of 
ideology (Chua 1995, Lawson 1998, George 2004) and bureaucratization (Chan 
1976) in consolidating dominance. However, such works were published before the 
recent change in Prime Minister and with the positing that there is a new shift in 
strategy, they no longer suffice for two reasons.  
Firstly, such works are generally too narrowly focused on the state and 
perhaps as a result many arguments center on the dialectic between coercion and 
consent. The state defined in a Weberian sense has a monopoly over the legitimate 
means of violence, and much has been discussed on how the PAP has shifted from 
coercive measures to more consensual means. By amplifying the balance between 
coercion and consent, key features of the new strategy will be inadequately captured. 
Such a dialectical focus is too blunt an analytical tool to understand this current shift 
to a discursive emphasis on welfare and grassroots initiatives, with both merely 
captured as continued efforts to enforce consensual rule.  
Secondly, the actual mechanisms of the consolidation and maintenance of 
political power at the ground have been generally neglected by most literature, 
except for a 1976 study by Chan who clearly articulates that “in any political system a 
link must exist between the political system and the masses” (1976:13). Most 
envision the state as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only 
at the interests of the totality, or a class of a group among the citizens. It is 
perplexing that little have been done to investigate political dynamics at the level of 
the everyday except for a handful of published works that highlight the presence of 
grassroots organizations as an aside to other interests (Hill and Lian 1996, Koh and 
Ooi 2000, Mauzy and Milne 2002, Mutalib 2003), or deals specifically with PAP 
branches (Chan 1975, 1976), community centres (Seah 1985a) and decentralization 
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of the government (Haque 1996). Thus, a total picture of how political power 
operates to enforce dominance is largely unavailable.  
I argue that in order to fully understand politics under the helm of the new 
Prime Minister, focus must not be placed merely on the state. In addition, focus also 
cannot be wholly placed on individuals as while the analysis of individual choices and 
rational cost-benefit calculations are pertinent considerations (Olsen 1965, Horton et 
al 1981, Horton 2000, Ott et al 2001), more important in sociological research are 
structural considerations which affects the choices and rationality of individuals. 
Acknowledging the merits of both structural and individualistic studies, the focus of 
this thesis is placed on the links between the state and individuals as well as 
institutions at the grassroots. The state’s power lies in its ability for what Foucault 
terms as totalizing and individualizing techniques of control and if only totalizing 
techniques of power are studied, power will be seen as one step removed from the 
practicalities of everyday life and remain a “mysterious” substance that escapes 
critical analysis (Foucault 2000: 16). To investigate the dynamics of and interactions 
between micro and macro political process in the overall process of maintaining 
political dominance, grassroots organizations are deemed to have important 
analytical relevance.  
Grassroots organizations with their extensive networks affect the lives of 
many. It is thus important to give a more detailed picture of these capillary power 
networks that is presently available, understanding diverse issues ranging from 
grassroots renewal and problems of succession, to grassroots mobilization as well 
the linkages between grassroots organizations and political organizations. The 
Singapore state has been lauded as a model for other small developing nations to 
emulate. With the potential of both economic as well as political infrastructures being 
replicated in other countries, the consequences of this study have wide-reaching 
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implications. This thesis first highlights the empirical puzzles that inspired research 
and then introduces the theoretical framework adopted for analysis. 
  
6 
2 Setting the Stage: Changing Economic and Socio-political Contexts and 
Empirical Puzzles  
  
It is clear that the economic context for Singapore in the 2000s has changed. 
Unlike the 1990s where macro economic growth translated to employment for many 
from the unskilled to professionals, continued economic restructuring will see 
thousands of older, less-educated workers remain unemployed because of the lack 
of necessary skills needed in the higher-end manufacturing industry. The drive to 
consolidate Singapore’s position as a major chemicals hub, develop the biomedical 
sciences as a new growth area, build new pharmaceutical plants and move the 
electronics industry into “next-generation display technologies” will mean the creation 
of more employment for skilled workers (Lee Hsien Loong, Straits Times 1 January 
2006). 
Together with a changed economic landscape, socio-political dynamics have 
also evolved.  It has been reported in the press that Singaporeans are finding 
creative ways to express their views on political issues. 
White elephants on placards, including one showing VIP visitors its butt near 
the Buangkok MRT station. Singaporeans wearing ribbons of all hues to 
show their support for causes, or displeasure on issues. Online petitions 
against the Government’s decision to allow casinos or to rally support for a 
presidential candidate. What is Singapore coming to nowadays? 
(Straits Times 17 September 2005) 
For example in 2005 a group called Families Against the Casino Threat in Singapore 
(Facts) organized an online petition against the proposed casino, and eight placards 
of white elephants were placed outside an MRT station to show displeasure towards 
its continued closure. Such new developments in public expressions may be 
construed as indicators of the changing socio-political environment that Lee 
manages as the current Prime Minister. 
With this changed economic and socio-political contexts, two related 
empirical puzzles have been observed. Firstly, there has been a discernable shift in 
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the government’s approach to welfare, where its current exhortations of workfare, or 
aid tied to work, stand in contrast with its fervent anti-welfare stance since the 1960s. 
With this changing discourse on welfare, there is the emergence of a new Subject – 
that of the Low Wage Worker1. In the new economic context, there is a race to the 
bottom in Asia. With increasingly competitive labor costs, there is a downward push 
of salaries for the less-skilled jobs and we are beginning to see a mismatch between 
low-paying jobs and high costs of living and as a result of this mismatch, the subject 
of the Low Wage Worker has emerged in government discourse, and has become 
the focus of current welfare efforts. 
In tandem with the changing discourse on welfare and the emergence of the 
Low Wage Worker, the second puzzle is the change in the nature of grassroots 
organizations in Singapore, from having a political emphasis in the 1960s to a leisure 
and welfare focus in the 2000s. Most literature on grassroots organizations in 
Singapore, reflecting past field observations, have painted a picture of institutional 
anachronism (Chan 1976, Hill and Lian 1996) or conceptualized them as 
parapolitical organizations (Seah 1985b). However, current developments require a 
rethinking of their role in the political and social landscape. This chapter first 
describes the changing socio-economic context before investigating the two 
interrelated puzzles. 
 
2.1 Ossification of Class Structure & Socio-Political Developments 
 
Singapore’s economy has fundamentally changed due to both internal and 
external factors such as trade, globalization, technological advancements and 
government industrial policies (IFER Report 2002). Much has been written about the 
                                                 
1 Many articles in the national daily The Straits Times refer to the Low Wage Workers as the Working 
Poor. In this thesis I refer to this new Subject as the Low Wage Worker.  
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government’s quick adaptability to global economic conditions, from the switch from 
import substitution development to export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s, to 
the changing of its manufacturing industrial structure to higher stages of production 
in the 1970s, to the replacement of labor and capital-intensive production with 
skilled-capital intensive production in the 1980s, and to the emphasis on structural 
adjustment of its manufacturing base towards more skilled and knowledge-based 
activities in the 1990s, which continues in the 2000s (Sours 1994, Tremewan 1994, 
Soon and Tan 1997, Vasil 2000, Ho 2000, Quah 2001, Mauzy and Milne 2002, IFER 
Report 2002, Mutalib 2003, Worthington 2003). Much work on Singapore’s economy 
over the years since independence have been written (You et al 1971; Wong 1979; 
Krause, Koh and Lee 1987, Peebles and Wilson 1996; Toh et al 1998) and for the 
sake of brevity and updating currently available works on Singapore’s economy, this 
thesis focuses on recent economic conditions from 1990 till to date. 
Singapore’s development into a mature economy is accompanied by two 
diverging wage trends, where professional and skilled workers command 
increasingly higher wages while the semi-skilled and unskilled works see their wages 
become progressively depressed due to the influx of cheap foreign workers. This 
wage differential was made more pronounced by the 1998 economic recession due 
to different rates of recovery in the labor market (Singapore Department of Statistics 
Occasional Working Paper 2000:1).  
In real terms, household income has increased from 1990-2006. However 
this increase is not uniform across all segments of the population, resulting in an 
increasingly pronounced income disparity. Using data from the 1990 and 2000 
Census of Population, the 1995 and 2005 General Household Surveys, the June 
1997 and June 1999 Labor Force Survey, the 2002/3 Household Expenditure Survey, 
as well as occasional working papers from the Department of Statistics Singapore 
9 
and Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, the economic context for discursive 
elaboration is provided2, first for the period 1990-1997, and thereafter 1998-20063. 
For the period 1990-1997, a widening income gap can be seen as the rate of 
growth for household income was not uniform and the bottom deciles of household 
income earners registered a decline, from $370 in 1990 to $325 in 1997 (Table 1). 
This decline in their income is contrasted with growth of over 6% for those above the 
20th percentile. In general, households above the 10th percentile and above fared 
better in 1997 than in 1990 with more households in the higher income bracket. 
Households earning $3000 or more increased from 36.9% in 1990 to 59.0% in 1997 
while households earning below $1000 dropped from 16.0% to 9.6%. 
Table 1: Average Household Income by Decile 1990 & 1997 
Decile 1990 1997 Average Annual 
Change (%) 
Bottom 10% 370 325  -1.8 
Next 10% 934 1,341  5.3 
    
Next 10% 1,321 1,988  6.0 
Next 10% 1,686 2,598  6.4 
    
Next 10% 2,075 3,237  6.6 
Next 10% 2,541 3,997  6.7 
    
Next 10% 3,116 4,909  6.7 
Next 10% 3,897 6,054  6.5 
    
Next 10% 5,152 7,915  6.3 
Top 10% 9,670 14,801  6.3 
(Singapore Department of Statistics 1998:6) 
A measure of income distribution among households is the Gini Coefficient4.  
As can be seen in Table 2, income disparity rose for the period between 1990 and 
                                                 
2 It is acknowledged that there is no strict comparability of data due to the different nature of surveys 
conducted. But I argue that they analyzed together adequately show broad economic trends.  
3  This is because of the Asian Financial crisis which affected Singapore in 1997-998. This event 
affected economic trends and necessitates that the period between 1990 and 2006 be split into two 
periods for analysis.  
4 In the situation of a perfect distribution of income, the Gini coefficient will be zero and the more 
unequal the income distribution, the larger the Gini coefficient. 
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1997, from 0.436 in 1990 to 0.444 in 1997. Another measure is the ratio of the 
average income of the top and bottom 20% of household income which also rose 
from 11.4 in 1990, to 13.6 in 1997. These figures show the trend of rising income 
disparity in the 1990s. 
Table 2: Measures of Household Income Disparity, 1990-1999 
 Gini Coefficient Ratio of average income of 
top 20% to bottom 20% 
1990 0.436 11.4 
1995 0.443 13.8 
1997 0.444 13.6 
1998 0.446 14.6 
1999 0.467 17.9 
(Source: Compiled from Singapore Department of Statistics 2000) 
The economic downturn in late 1997 further widened income disparity. This 
was due to differential impacts of the downturn on different segments of the labor 
market. Structural unemployment – a situation where the jobless cannot find 
employment due to lack of skills, were first sounded by then Deputy Secretary-
General of the National Trades Union Congress Lim Swee Say in 1997 (Straits 
Times 13 November 1997) and has affected Singapore in earnest after 2001 
(Singapore Department of Statistics Working Paper 2000:7). In 2005, half of the 
resident households received a monthly household income of $3,800 and above. 
While there were proportionally more households earning at least $6,000 per month 
at 27.1% in 2000 compared with 31.2% in 2005, there were also proportionally more 
households earning less that $2000 a month, at 27.4% in 2005 compared with 26.6% 
in 2000. 
In addition, the average household income from work declined for households 
in the 2nd and 3rd decile groups in 2005 (Table 3). This is in contrast to the positive 
average annual change in household income for all other deciles, which saw 
increases ranging from 0.3% to 2.8%. 
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Table 3: Average Monthly Household Income from Work by Decile Among All 
Resident Households 
Decile  Average Household Income  Average Annual Change (%) 
  2000  2004 2005  2004  2005  2000-
2005 
Total  4,940  5,170 5,400  2.7  4.4  1.8 
            
1st -10th  90  - -  -  -  - 
11th - 20th  1,470  1,170 1,180  0.2  0.8  -4.3 
            
21st- 30th  2,250  2,140 2,190  4.3  2.6  -0.5 
31st-40th  2,950  2,890 2,990  1.9  3.7  0.3 
41st-50th  3,660  3,670 3,850  2.1  4.8  1.0 
51st-60th  4,470  4,600 4,840  1.3  5.2  1.6 
61st-70th  5,390  5,510 5,890  1.3  6.9  1.8 
71st-80th  6,520  6,820 7,260  0.6  6.5  2.2 
            
81st-90th  8,270  8,960 9,300  2.6  3.8  2.4 
91st-100th  14,360  15,960 16,480  5.0  3.3  2.8 
            
(Source: General Household Survey 2005:27) 
Due to unequal rates of growth of household income as well as recovery from the 
1998 economic downturn, income inequality continued to rise as indicated by the 
Gini coefficient, as well as the ratio of income between the top and bottom 20% of 
income earners (Table 4, General Household Survey 2005). Reflecting the trend of a 
widening income disparity, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.490 in 2000 to 0.517 in 
2004 and 0.522 in 2005 among all resident and employed households. 
Table 4: Measures of Inequality in Per Capita Household Income from Work 
 All Households Employed Households 
 Gini 
Coefficient 
Ratio of Average 
Per Capita Income 




Ratio of Average 
Per Capita Income 
of Top 20% to 
Lowest 20% 
 
2000 0.490 20.9 0.422 10.0 
2001 0.493 19.5 0.455 11.0 
2002 0.505 25.4 0.455 11.2 
2003 0.512 28.1 0.458 11.4 
2004 0.517 29.6 0.463 11.6 
2005 0.522 31.9 0.468 12.1 
(Source: General Household Survey 2005:29) 
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Together with a changing economic context, the socio-political environment 
has also evolved and can be illustrated with a recent incident where eight placards of 
white elephants were placed outside an unopened MRT station. On 28 August 2005, 
Minister for Community Development Youth and Sports Dr Vivian Balakrishnan 
visited Punggol South for a constituency tour. The date also marked the second 
anniversary of the opening of the North-east MRT line, which Buangkok MRT station 
– situated in Punggol South – is part of. It was reported that both residents and 
grassroots leaders have lobbied for its opening for over two years but without 
success as the Land Transport Authority said that some 2,000 housing units within a 
400m radius of the station are needed to generate enough traffic to justify its opening. 
Instead, it was scheduled to be opened in 2008, by which time it was estimated that 
there would be 2000 to 3000 housing units within 400m of the station (Straits Times 
16 January 2006). 
On the day of the constituency visit, eight cut-outs of white elephants in 
various poses were placed by “unidentified Punggol South residents” outside the 
station (Straits Times 2 September 2005), to make their point over the station’s long 
delayed opening (Straits Times 16 January 2006). The display prompted a range of 
reactions from Singaporeans, from amused chuckles to observations that it was a 
sign of bolder political expression. When it was reported that the police was 
investigating this issue, disapprovals were sounded and it was argued that it was 
“poor showing for any government to clamp down on such harmless public 
expression” of discontentment (17 September 2005). About two months after media 
attention was given to this incident, it was announced in November 2005 that the 
station’s opening would be brought forward by two years “to better serve the 
residents of new housing developments nearby” (Straits Times 16 January 2006). 
Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean in his official opening speech “praised grassroots 
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leaders for their enthusiasm and creativity in making their case to open Buangkok” 
(Straits Times 16 January 2006). In lobbying for the opening of the station, Teo said 
that “the company [SBS Transit] had inadvertently provided residents and his 
grassroots leaders an opportunity to bond for a common cause” (Ibid.). Importantly, 
this incident became a “test case of how Government would treat such protests if 
they became more common” (Straits Times 7 October 2005), and may be 
understood as a clear example of greater political vocality among the people.  
Challenges from economic volatility will change to social and political ones if 
nothing is done to preempt disenfranchisement. Previous industrialization efforts laid 
the basis for full employment and major social improvements in areas such as public 
housing, health and education, as well as generated considerable upward social 
mobility (Rodan 1997:148). However, structural limits to social mobility are becoming 
more visible, with sharper differentiation between income for the skilled and the 
unskilled. When class mobility is an important legitimator of PAP dominance, the 
ossification of class structure as indicated by growing income inequality will lead us 
to expect a response from the ruling party to adapt to the changing context. Given 
the ideological hostility of the PAP towards welfare-oriented redistributive policies, 
the attempt to reconcile the image of being generous with public provisions with 
economic rationality, efficient and anti-welfare rhetoric has produced an interesting 
discourse. This is the first empirical puzzle that this thesis addresses. 
 
2.2 Changing Discourse on Welfare and the Emergence of the Low Wage 
Worker 
 
Singapore started as a small British trading post, and was a temporary stop 
for many of its inhabitants. As a colony populated by migrants, there was little 
pressure for the government to provide substantial forms of welfare. Social 
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infrastructure was undeveloped and colonial administrative powers were weak, and it 
was associations vis-à-vis secret societies, clans and kin groups that offered support 
in matters of housing, health, work and safety. The government avoided for the most 
part the provision of comprehensive non-contributory welfare programs for fear that 
individual dependency on the state would be encouraged and personal work 
initiatives discouraged (Aspalter 2001:52-53). Social welfare provision in Singapore 
can be traced back to 1946, with the setting up of the Social Welfare Department 
(Singapore Council of Social Services 1983). Targeted at the destitute and 
unemployable due to physical disabilities or poor health, a Public Assistance 
Scheme was available only to a very small number of citizens (Josey 1979: 118). 
With Independence in 1965, the discourse on welfare from the 1960s to mid 
1980s was essentially pragmatic, where the people were told to be “rugged 
individuals” and disciplined. This suited the ideologies of meritocracy, individualism, 
pragmatism and survivalism that were exhorted by the government after 
Independence, and were effective safeguards against any call for welfare. The 
government embraced economic liberalism and adopted a marked antipathy towards 
welfare, where the workings of the market should not be undermined as the rewards 
of economic development would spread through the population. As stated by then 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
Hard work and high performance must be encouraged and rewarded. No one 
should get away with enjoying services, subsidized through the hard work of 
others, without making his own contribution to the best of his ability and 
capacity. 
(cited in Aspalter 1989:53) 
Singapore is not a welfare state in the commonly understood definition of the 
term, i.e. “social amelioration through income redistribution as a right of citizenship” 
(Tremewan 1998:78). It does not have a comprehensive social safety net for the 
disadvantaged, and public assistance is meager. There are no social security 
15 
schemes such as family allowance, and unemployment insurance - a mainstay of 
every welfare state - is absent (Tang 2000:47). Public assistance is stringent and 
paltry, with less than 1% of the total resident population receiving aid, and those who 
qualify for aid receiving only half of their minimum household requirements (Lim 
1989:187). 
However, if the definition of welfare is defined more broadly in terms of not 
just social security but also housing, education and health, it can be argued that the 
PAP has engaged in large-scale social welfare policies. It can be interpreted that 
there was almost universal consumption of state welfare in Singapore through public 
housing, which has been seen as crucial to the legitimacy of PAP’s dominance and a 
central feature of governance and social regulation (Chua 1995, 2005; Tang 2000; 
Tremewan 1994, 1998; Rodan 1997), and remains highly politicized till the 2000s. 
Following the views of Ramesh and Asher (2000), a broad understanding of welfare 
in Singapore can be had by referring to social security, housing, health and 
education policies. This multi-pronged focus allows for the examination of two 
aspects of social policies – first the preparation of individuals for entry into productive 
work in the market, and secondly the protection of workers who become 
unproductive. Education prepares individuals to function in the marketplace and thus 
serves to promote the sustainability of workers within a capitalist system. Housing 
and health policies together with social assistance in terms of income maintenance 
aim to protect those who become unproductive and find subsistence precarious. In 
Singapore, public policies place overwhelming emphasis on education, housing and 
health to the comparative neglect of social assistance. 
Rapid macro-economic success translated into uneven material 
improvements for the population from 1960s to 1980s, and welfare did not become 
an issue until the start of economic uncertainties and comparisons of relative 
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economic deprivation. One of the consequences of economic success has been a 
more complex political economy characterized by both increased social plurality as 
well as material expectations of which the working and lower middles class 
expressed the most concern.  Then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong formed a 
committee of Ministers of States in 1989 to chart the next phase of development and 
in 1991, the Committee published a book titled The Next Lap. The term “many 
helping hands” was introduced to describe the approach of the government towards 
welfare in the 1990s under the helm of new leaders. This approach called on other 
sectors of society to help out, where  “the government, corporate citizens, community 
organizations, religious groups, voluntary groups, concerned citizens and family 
members” can work together to “grow as a compassionate and caring society” (The 
Next Lap 1991:119). 
The discourse on welfare in the 1990s is clear – welfare is not a right of 
citizenship, and sole responsibility for the care of the needy does not lie with the 
government. Rather, the government stressed minimal involvement by the state and 
emphasized community involvement. As argued in Parliament, then acting Minister 
for Community Development Abdullah Tarmugi said that 
Community development is not, cannot, and must not be the sole 
responsibility of the Government. Organizations and individuals must also be 
involved to build a compassionate society. 
(Straits Times 24 March 1995) 
The government clearly expressed that aid would be in ways that do not breed 
dependency or weaken the motivation to work and develop self-reliance. The "many 
helping hands" approach would ensure that community, religious and grassroots 
organizations play a part in providing services and programmes, with the 
Government providing the catalyst, infrastructure, resources and expertise (Straits 
Times 20 March 1996).  Families and individuals are exhorted to be independent and 
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self-reliant, standing “on their own two feet, rather than depend on handouts which 
would erode their self-esteem” (Straits Times 30 December 1995). Besides giving 
cash through the public assistance scheme, the poor were given waiver of rents and 
conservancy charges, free medical treatment in Government or restructured 
hospitals and outpatient clinics, and free textbooks for children. Community self-help 
groups such as Mendaki, the Singapore Indian Development Association (Sinda) and 
the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) were also established where 
welfare would be disbursed along officially-defined communal ethnic ties (Straits 
Times 30 December 1995). 
Target recipients of welfare were described as a “small segment of the 
population” (Ministry of Community Development 1997:1). The government was 
discursively portrayed as an “invisible hand” (Straits Times 24 March 1995) and a 
“stern parent with a warm heart” (Straits Times 20 December 1996), adopting a low 
profile even as it cares for the people's welfare. Rather than providing the “soft” 
option of handouts, the government as “stern parent” decided that "the best form of 
welfare is to create wealth and then to share the fruit of success” (Straits Times 20 
December 1996). The “few” Singaporeans who found it hard to cope would receive 
help to be self-reliant, and the able would be encouraged to chip in. It can be 
gleaned that the discourse on welfare has shifted to a communitarian one, where the 
role of the community in helping the less successful is emphasized.  
In helping the less fortunate, Singapore believes that everyone has a 
responsibility to help the disadvantaged. The aim is to foster a caring and 
compassionate society by encouraging those who are able, to help those who 
are less able. This shared philosophy unites our society, as the shaping of a 
caring society is only possible through a partnership among the people, the 
Government, the community and civic organizations. 
(Ministry of Community Development 1997:2) 
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A number of policies were introduced to deal with public anxiety about 
increasing material inequalities. For example, in 1994 then Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong announced that the majority of Singaporeans received more benefits and 
subsidies than the taxes they paid, with “asset enhancement programmes” that 
transferred funds from the government to subsidize education, health care, public 
housing and education. In 1996, a total of $1.65 billion were disbursed in a variety of 
redistributive measures to benefit students, the aged, flat owners, small-time stall 
owners as well as charitable and community self-help groups (Straits Times 18 
September 1993). Such non-discriminatory welfare disbursement is not subject to 
any means-testing, and has been discursively framed as ad hoc “rewards” rather 
than “rights” of citizens. 
As described, the pragmatic discourse on welfare in the 1960s to the 1980s 
pared social redistributive policies to a minimum and emphasized individual 
responsibility. The communitarian discourse on welfare in the 1990s has as its 
objective the reinforcing of the understanding that welfare provision is not the sole 
responsibility of the state but involves the community and it reemphasizes the view 
that welfare is not a right of citizenship. For example in the 1998 Budget Speech, a 
distinct anti-welfare stance is seen. 
The absence of large scale public assistance programmes reflects the 
Government's stand on state welfarism. We believe that extensive welfare 
programmes damage the fabric of our society as they diminish individual 
responsibility, self-reliance, community support and the work ethic. .... Our 
approach is one of many helping hands, with co-funding from Government 
and public donations, and services rendered by volunteers and members of 
the community. 
(Lee, 1998 Budget Speech) 
 
Again in 2005, Lee asserted that welfare is a “seductive” but “dangerous dead end” 
that “kills” people’s drive to work. 
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If we erode the work ethic by giving out over generous subsidies and grants, 
we will also fail. Government spending will balloon, and taxes must go up. 
More damagingly, we will kill the drive of our people, and chase away talent 
and investments. Welfarism may seem a seductive short cut, but it is actually 
a dangerous dead end.  
(Lee, Straits Times 1 May 2005) 
In the 2000s however, this fervent anti-welfare stance that emphasizes self-reliance, 
community engagement and the work ethic is however juxtaposed with the 
articulation of the need to help those lower income households. In Lee’s first speech 
as Prime Minister in 2006, this change in discourse is clearly seen, where amidst a 
backdrop of economic uncertainty, the community will progress and those less able 
will be helped. 
The majority of Singaporeans will be able to adapt to and keep up with the 
changes. But some Singaporeans, especially among the older and lower-
income groups, are finding it harder to cope. We will extend a helping hand to 
these Singaporeans, so that we can all move forward together as one nation 
and one people. … We will do everything we can to help every citizen 
maximize his (sic) potential. … No one will be left behind as Singapore 
progresses, so long as he makes the effort and plays his part (sic). 
(Lee, Straits Times 1 January 2006) 
The contradictory stance towards welfare has been resolved recently with the 
notion of workfare, a term introduced in 2006. With workfare, the ideology of self-
reliance and the call for  “proper” work ethics will be preserved as even when 
disbursing welfare, this is premised on the promise that the individual will actively 
seek employment if currently unemployed, or stay employed if currently so. As 
introduced, 
Workfare – not welfare – is the correct response to address the challenges 
facing low wage workers. Through workfare, individuals are encouraged to 
work and achieve self-sufficiency for themselves and their families. It is a 
sustainable approach that reaffirms our work ethic. 
(Lee, Letter to Ng Eng Heng, Chairman of Ministerial Committee on Low 
Wage Workers, 9 January 2006) 
 
The number of recipients for welfare in the 1990s is small and may be understood as 
forming the category of the absolutely unemployable – namely those medically unfit 
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for work, the aged destitute as well as disabled persons. These absolutely 
unemployable are politically invisible, atomized and isolated (Tang 2000:53). Into the 
2000s, this focus of welfare has shifted from this small group of the population to 
those who experience the negative consequences of capitalism – the Low Wage 
Worker or Working Poor, a Subject that arose in discursive formations on state-led 
economic restructuring to tackle changing socio-economic contexts. 
As early as October 2001, there was the first use of the term Working Poor, 
but it was mentioned in the context of a cyclical economic downturn, where 
America’s welfare policies were examined to see what Singapore could adopt to help 
its bottom 10% of income earners that has seen their household income drop by 
nearly half from 1998 to 1999. It was also in 2001 that the welfare nature of 
grassroots organizations became apparent. 
One discernible trend emerging from this recession is the proliferation of 
grassroots programmes to reach out to the needy. Unhindered by 
bureaucratic constraints, these organizations have swung into action, offering 
money, jobs, food and a sympathetic shoulder to lean on.    
(Straits Times 13 October 2001) 
For example, grassroots organizations in Ang Mo Kio constituency started a 
$150,000 financial-aid scheme and the Central Singapore Community Development 
Council started a relief scheme to help about 600 needy families in the area, 
providing subsidies to cover school fees, food vouchers, job assistance and skills 
upgrading to families where the breadwinner has been retrenched as well as a $1-
million fund to provide subsidized training for residents. 
The Subject of the Low Wage Worker or Working Poor “disappeared” from 
public discourse as economic conditions picked up, emerging again only on 6 
December 2004, during a speech by then newly appointed Chairman of the National 
Trades Union Congress Mr Lim Boon Heng who mentioned the global presence of 
500 million Working Poor. This “international” Working Poor became a domestic 
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subject, termed Low Wage Worker, in 2005 when he highlighted the plight of “low-
wage earners” and urged employees to raise low wages. The Subject of the Low 
Wage Workers became more apparent in June 2005 with the formation of a 
Ministerial Committee on Low Wage Workers, and further emphasized in August 
2005 with the launch of ComCare. In an article published in August 2005, this 
Subject was the focus of a report on long term aid for low income families, where it 
was written that 
There's a new paradigm in thinking about how to help the poor in 
Singapore… In essence, there's a willingness to go beyond helping the 
destitute and temporarily unemployed, to provide long-term help to the 
working poor. 
(Straits Times 26 August 2005) 
The Subject was further crystallized in the 2006 Budget Speech titled “Help for All” 
which had handouts worth $2.6 billion for everyone and introduced a systematic 
framework to provide support in cash and kind to low wage workers. 
 The 2006 Budget showed that the Low Wage Worker required not just 
transitional help but permanent, structural support. Before the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997, welfare provision in the form of cash handouts were paltry and limited to the 
destitute and those who were unable to work. Thereafter when unemployment rose, 
an additional tier of transitional help in the form of income replacement schemes 
such as the Work Assistance Program, the Interim Financial Assistance Scheme and 
the Self-Reliance Program were introduced with the expectation of future self-reliant. 
With increasing income inequality and the rise of both cyclical and structural 
unemployment, more permanent structural help were introduced by the Committee 
on Low Wage Workers, espoused in a report released on 12 January 2006 which 
recommended wide-ranging assistance to help low wage workers and households. 
 With the changing economic and socio-political context, the ideologies of 
meritocracy and self-reliance are still utilized, together with the communitarian 
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discourse of helping every citizen to succeed. While the “Many Helping Hands” 
approach is still used, the target population is no longer small and confined to the 
absolutely unemployable. Currently about 500,000 workers in Singapore’s resident 
labor force has less than secondary education, and many are older workers. Low 
Wage Workers, defined as “those falling below the 20th income percentile, i.e. who 
earn $1,200 or less in gross monthly income” (Ministry of Manpower Press Release 
30 June 2005, www.mom.gov.sg) form around 20% of full-time workers, with their 
figures estimated at about 300,000. In addition, about 67,000 Low Wage Workers 
live in households with a monthly household income of $1,500 or less (Statement by 
Dr Ng Eng Hen, http://app.feedback.gov.sg). 
Much has been reported about the changing economic context, and what has 
been done to counter the problems that structural unemployment brings. For 
example, Minister for Manpower and Second Minister for Defense Ng Eng Hen 
stated that 
The economic and employment landscape has changed dramatically in 
recent years. Simply put, hundreds of millions of lower-cost skilled workers 
from China, India, Eastern Europe ad Latin America have entered into the 
global workforce. Competition from these workers and economic restructuring 
are exerting downward pressure on the wages of less skilled workers in all 
countries including unskilled workers here in Singapore.  
(http://app.feedback.gov.sg) 
Such global comparisons may be construed as attempts to normalize Singapore’s 
experience as one way to deal with the discontentment of the Low Wage Worker. 
The changing discourse on welfare may also be framed as another channel to effect 
control over this segment of the population. If the current discourse on welfare is 
understood as a new mode of social control, the second empirical puzzle adds 
greater credence to this conjecture5.  
                                                 
5 It is acknowledged that there are alternative perspectives, and they will be mentioned as the thesis 
progresses.  
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2.3 Changing Nature of Grassroots Organizations 
A seminal work which examines politics on the ground is Chan’s 1975 work. It 
investigates the actual functioning of PAP’s political base at the micro-level by 
examining five PAP branches in five constituencies. She acknowledges that at the 
constituency level, PAP branches have little influence, and their scope of activity is 
small. Limited to weekly Meet-the-People Sessions and the running of kindergartens, 
they seem to have no useful function “except that of existing” (Chan 1975:103), 
generally becoming hives of activity only during General Elections. 
She highlights that of greater significance to PAP dominance is its links to 
grassroots organizations. As she states,  
… PAP party organization has been observed to be relatively dormant except 
for a very limited area of activity. It would seem almost inapt to speak of PAP 
‘dominance’ in this context but for the fact that there is an increasing merger 
of Government and party at the local constituency. So, where party activity 
levels off, newly created governmental institutions such as the Citizen’s 
Consultative Committees (CCC) and the community centres replace the party 
organization’s role and functions, and the ubiquitous presence of the party is 
felt through these three institutions in combination....  
(Chan 1975:132) 
Thus it would seem that grassroots organizations and their activities are important to 
the PAP, and would be one factor influencing efforts to maintain continued political 
dominance. It is irrefutable that grassroots organizations played crucial political and 
social roles in the 1950s to the early 1970s, with then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
stating that 
Few people know how crucial a role the People’s Association has played in 
Singapore in the last 20 years, and what a key institution it still is. 
(People’s Association Conference 1980:7) 
 
The People’s Association was predated by Community Centers who had their 
beginnings in Singapore’s colonial history. In June 1946, the colonial government set 
up a Social Welfare Department to spearhead efforts at encouraging community 
development (Turnbull 1989:239). This led to the “birth of a number of community 
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centres, of which a few grew out of … feeding and children’s centres” (Singapore 
Council of Social Service 1981:1). These pioneer community centres were deemed 
successful and in 1953, funds were set aside by the Social Welfare Department to 
build two community centres in Serangoon and Siglap. 
Managed by colonial administrators, these community centres provided a 
place for local residents to meet for social and recreational programs and more 
specifically to disseminate colonial government policies and information (Singapore 
Council of Social Service 1981:1). They did not receive much attention from the 
Social Welfare Department due to more pressing concerns of political unrest and it 
was only after Singapore attained self-governance in 1959 that community centres 
came under the purview of the government. Amidst a backdrop of historical unrest 
and leftist influence on trade unions, student organizations, organizations of farmers, 
rural residents and the most dynamic of Singapore’s cultural groups (Ibid.), the 
government established the People’s Association in 1960 as a Statutory Board which 
took over 28 community centres and five youth clubs (People’s Association 1978: 17). 
It was to be  
a government grassroots organization to combat the Communist United Front 
which was the dominant political force in Singapore … [and] as a second line 
of defense in case the [People’s Action] Party Branches went over to the 
Communists when the open fight between the Communists and the 
democratic socialists began…  
(People’s Association 1978:22) 
Even while coercive measures were used to deal with the leftists, it was deemed 
essential for the post-split PAP helming the government from 1968 to consolidate 
political dominance through more consensual means (People’s Association 1978:22).  
In 1980 the political significance of the institution in trying to gain consent 
from the ruled was strongly portrayed. 
It is no use hiding the fact that the beginnings of the People’s Association had 
political connotations. It was basically targeted towards winning over the 
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hearts and minds of the rural folk who came under strong Communist 
influence.  
(People’s Association, 1980:345) 
In order to ensure the “survival of the non-Communist state”, the People’s 
Association was to be the bridge between the government and the masses. This 
bridge will be staffed by “civil servants and party cadres” (People’s Association 
1980:33, emphasis added). The People’s Association’s past as the bridge between 
the government and the masses shows its political significance. Staffed by party 
cadres from the PAP and being the “second line of defence” (Peoples’ Association 
1978:22), it is hard to deny the People’s Association’s partisan past.  
However, this crucial relationship between the People’s Association and the 
ruling party has been de-emphasized in contemporary discourse. In the anniversary 
magazine commemorating People’s Association’s 25th anniversary, Lee Kuan Yew, 
then Prime Minister and Chairman of the People’s Association said 
From the outset the government anticipated the necessity of insulating the 
[People’s Association] and the management of its community centres from 
interference by political parties or opposition MPs. The [People’s Association] 
and community centres are instruments of government to carry out its policies 
of nation-building. The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the [People’s 
Association]. … The Prime Minister and the Cabinet decide the political thrust, 
the direction and policies of the PA. 
(People’s Association, 1985:8) 
It was portrayed as a non-partisan government conduit and its political beginnings 
were denied. Nevertheless, the People’s Association’s history was discursively 
framed as a turbulent one with threats of secret societies, racial tensions and 
communist uprisings, and sections described the defection of several People’s 
Association staff to the communist party Barisan Socialis were framed as 
“communist cadres … had covertly wormed their way into the organizational 
woodwork and then to the shock and dismay of [People’s Association] officials, 
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crawled out in a body when pro-communist factions in the PAP staged a schism 
within the party in July 1961” (People’s Association, 1985:32).  
With is political roles denied, its social role was emphasized. The People’s 
Association and grassroots organizations were then seen as essential to community 
development, and to combat “new social problems such as alienation and 
restlessness of youths and the loneliness of the aged …” (People’s Association, 
1985:10). During a conference held to ascertain the role of Community Centers in 
the 1980s, Community Centers were asked to have a core program to 
meet the basic requirements of the community” and organize “more service-
oriented programs … to meet new social needs, eg. caring for the aged, 
looking after the young for working mothers, providing free or low-cost tuition, 
and helping to solve some of the social problems, eg. drug abuse, crime and 
delinquency  
(People’s Association 1978:7) 
The Community Extension Service Scheme were also supposed to include programs 
to “educate Singaporeans in the dignity of blue collar jobs, consumer consciousness, 
the importance of courtesy and the running of educational classes on good 
citizenship” (Ibid, 1978:10). In essence, the People’s Association was crucial as the 
government needed “an effective network of grassroots organizations to promote 
and strengthen the community in all our HDB housing estates” (Ibid). 
 Five years later in the People’s Association’s 30th anniversary magazine, its 
unstable beginning was only hinted at, and the defection of People’s Association 
staff mildly described in a caption accompanying a photograph as “Even some 
[People’s Association] staff was misled by anti-national elements” (People’s 
Association, 1990:24). The general trend of the magazine portrayed the concern of 
relevance, with the need for People’s Association to change with the times and to 
“inject a more upmarket image to appeal to the younger generation of more affluent 
and better educated citizens” (People’s Association, 1985: 11). It is felt that the 
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changing significance of the People’s Association is adequately symbolized by the 
change in name from “community centres” to “community clubs”. From having 
considerable political significance to crucial social roles, the People’s Association 
were in the 1990s concerned with upgrading in order to cater to varied interests. 
The young like the atmosphere and lifestyle of private clubs. Therefore 
community centre management committees have been given the right to 
make the community centres into community clubs… 
(People’s Association 1990:9) 
The political role was glossed over, and social goals reduced to the call of not 
neglecting the poor. 
 The discussion thus far leads to one central empirical puzzle: If the PAP is 
without doubt the dominant political party in Singapore, and if grassroots 
organizations are significant players in state-society relations with argued theoretical 
and historical importance, why have grassroots organizations become seemingly so 
socially and politically inconsequential? They have been cast as parts of a 
decentralized government (Haque 1996) or “parapolitical institutions” (Seah 1985b) 
to monitor the citizenry from the ground (Chan 1975, Seah 1985b, Haque 1996, 
Mutalib 2003). What is the political repercussion if one agrees with Chan (1976) that 
grassroots organizations are important for political dominance? Grassroots links and 
organizations are puzzlingly neglected or more oddly, denied political significance by 
the PAP. As early as 1978, this sense of inconsequentiality was mentioned. Goh 
Keng Swee said 
Since then [the 1960s] the PA has grown, I would like to have said, from 
strength to strength. But I am not sure about this. In terms of numbers of staff, 
cost and size of community centres, the growth has been substantial. But I 
suspect there is nagging doubt, whether all this money and effort has been 
spent to best purpose. 
(People’s Association, 1978:25) 
A conference held in 1978 titled “The Role of Community Centres in the 1980s” 
mentioned that  
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A new decade lies ahead. The challenges facing us would be vastly different 
from those of the 60s and 70s. The future role of community centres and their 
voluntary workers needed study and reshaping. 
(People’s Association, 1978:5) 
 
The demographic profile of Singapore had dramatically changed over the 
more than 25 years since the inception of the People’s Association’s. As 
acknowledged in 1978, 
The Association’s role in community development requires that it be critically 
sensitive to changes in an increasingly sophisticated society. 
(People’s Association, 1978:5) 
A shift towards the “modernizing” of community centers leisure-focused was 
apparent in the upgrading of many community centers and the change of names 
from “centers” to “clubs” to cater to an “increasingly sophisticated society”. This effort 
at updating the image of the People’s Association continued through the 1990s 
where its social function was slowly relinquished in favor of a focus on leisure 
activities6. Indeed, it would seem that the role of grassroots organizations is no 
longer critical for political dominance, against Chan’s 1975 study. 
Developments from the late 1990s however surface a conundrum and 
complicate any simple analysis of a linear trajectory towards irrelevance and 
institutional anachronism. During his 1996 National Day Rally Speech, then-Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong introduced a structural addition to the grassroots landscape. 
 
The Community Development Council is a return to the old community spirit 
of mutual help, this time with Government increasing the resources available 
to community leaders. The more able and successful should help the less 
able and the less well off... The community, especially those who receive help, 
will naturally respect the successful who look after them instead of resenting 
their success. The community will find themselves better off. This will help our 
citizens to build a civic society.  
(Goh Chok Tong, National Day Rally speech 17 August 1996) 
 
 
                                                 
6 This is gleaned from close reading the annual reports of the People’s Association, where the changing 
focus of each year’s report activities described over the years are scrutinized. 
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Identifying the need to promote community spirit and a sense of belonging and 
identity, Community Development Councils (CDCs) were introduced as part of the 
government’s efforts to strengthen bonding and enhance social cohesion within local 
communities (Straits Times 19 August 1996). Singapore was divided into five 
geographical regions, each headed by a mayor. It would be tasked with roles such 
as managing applications for Medifund, public assistance, Edusave bursaries and 
scholarships, and study loans. The creation of the CDC saw the institutionalizing of a 
comprehensive network of social services. As umbrella bodies, CDCs played an 
important social role as they worked closely with grassroots organizations, town 
councils, voluntary welfare organizations, schools and other organizations to 
facilitate the delivery of a wide and comprehensive range of community and public 
services.    
 This institutional addition of the CDCs was followed by the launching of the 
ComCare Fund on 28 July 2005. This $500 million fund adds to existing social safety 
nets such as Edusave, Medifund and Lifelong Learning Fund and involves CDCs, 
voluntary welfare organizations and grassroots organizations. This fund has been 
described as a channel through which the government will “engage the community to 
deliver social assistance more effectively”, where the vital role of community-based 
organizations such as grassroots organizations were emphasized. As Lee states, 
… ComCare will get CDCs, and the grassroots and community organizations 
more involved in delivering assistance programs for needy Singaporeans. 
This will be more flexible than a central government bureaucracy, and better 
able to exercise discretion and judgment. Being closer to the ground, our 
grassroots leaders know their residents best, and are best placed to identify 
those that need help and the kind of help required. As one grassroots leader 
put it, “we know because of out solid neighborhood network and we move 
around a lot”.  
(Speech at the Launch of Comcare, 28 June 2005) 
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Investigating government-funded grassroots organizations, a complex 
network of power relations is amplified and as a result of the sheer size of this 
network, they certainly are numerically important. In December 2004, there were 
about 1100 grassroots organizations, 24,670 grassroots leaders, and all Community 
centres had a combined membership of about 260,000 (People’s Association 
Workplan Seminar 2005). This new development effectively gives grassroots 
organizations a new leash of life, changing its emphasis from leisure activities to 
formal, institutionalized welfare provision in the eyes of the public even as the 
People’s Association continues to provide more “upscale” activities such as aqua 
aerobics, stone therapy, archery and golf classes catering to current popular fads. 
How can one understand the changing nature of grassroots organizations? 
This thesis agrees with Chan that in Singapore, political power works on the ground 
through inter-linkages with grassroots organizations7 and by looking at the level of 
grassroots, the microcosm of the state as well as the everyday manifestations of 
political power can be seen. Set against the changing economic context in Singapore, 
I argue that the changing discourse on welfare as well as the changing nature of 
grassroots organizations can be coherently dealt with using a Foucauldian 
framework.  
The theoretical premise upon which this thesis rests is that in any analysis of 
political dominance, attention must be paid to both macro as well as micro level 
power structures. In theoretical ruminations about the micro and macro level, a 
Foucauldian approach is adopted, where these two terms are defined not in terms of 
scale, but in terms of micro tactics and macro strategies as elucidated in what 
Foucault terms the rule of double conditioning where 
                                                 
7 This thesis focuses particularly on government-funded voluntary associations that have fixed territorial 
interests, an official membership-base of volunteers that are structured hierarchically, and are centered 
around Community Centers which are staffed by the People’s Association.  
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No “local centre”, no “pattern of transformation” could function if, through a 
series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy. … 
There is no discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two 
different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic); … rather, one 
must conceive of the double-conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of 
possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelop that makes them work.  
(Foucault 1980:99-100) 
Changes in governmental styles are theorized as shifts in strategies, providing a 
macro perspective on the exercise of power. The implementation of strategies will be 
operationalized as tactics to be closely examined at the level of the everyday, thus 
providing a complete picture of how power works to consolidate and reinforce 
political dominance.  
Macro political strategies have changed under new political leadership and 
changing economic and socio-political conditions. This shift in strategies is directing 
a change in micro tactics which is being reflected in the revitalization of grassroots 
organizations under a discourse of welfare. Adopting Foucault’s rule of double 
conditioning, it is argued that grassroots organizations have always been important, 
and what we have been observing is not the increasing irrelevance of grassroots 
organizations and its subsequent re-emphasis but rather a change in micro-tactics. 
Rather than interpreting the historical trajectory of grassroots organizations as one of 
increasing social and political unimportance, there has been a changing discourse on 
grassroots organizations, due to the need to shift relations of discipline and change 
strategical representations over the years. 
Set against the changed economic context of increasing income inequality 
and political volatility, the next chapter focuses on the theoretical framework used to 
make sense of the changing discourse of welfare, the emergence of the Low Wage 
Worker and the changing nature of grassroots organizations. 
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3 A Foucauldian Analysis  
It has been described in Chapter 1 that most studies on politics in Singapore 
can be classified as being macro-structural in their concern, dealing with and 
explicating societal-level processes and issues. A focus on institutions (such as 
parapolitical organizations), macro processes (such as ideological trajectories) and 
governmental structures (whether authoritarian or democratic) are statist and leave 
largely undiscussed the concrete workings and dynamics of power and its impact on 
individuals. 
An important work previously discussed that has a micro-level focus is 
Chan’s (1975) study on PAP branches. However, in its meticulous description it 
contributed to a greater understanding of the institutional structure of the PAP but 
does not provide sociological insights. The most theoretically informed work is by 
Chua (1995) in his seminal elaboration of ideological trajectories, where he used a 
Gramscian framework to trace the ideological changes in governance.  While 
providing much analytical insights to macro processes, the everyday mechanisms of 
such abstractions is largely undiscussed, and I will argue in this chapter that a 
Gramscian focus on hegemony as used in Chua’s (1995) work will not adequately 
explain the shift to a discursive emphasis on welfare and grassroots initiatives and 
will also problematically leave unanalyzed the consolidation and maintenance of 
political dominance on the ground.  
Empirically, the changing discourse on welfare coupled with the emergence 
of the Low Wage Worker, as well as the changing nature of grassroots organizations 
demands attention. This thesis aims to provide an angle of analysis that takes into 
account both macro processes and micro concerns, as well as tread the balance 
between a focus on institutions such as the state and organizations, as well as 
networks of relations between individuals and institutions. I argue that politics under 
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the helm of the third Prime Minister will be characterized by welfare as a new mode 
of social control. As a result, focus must not be placed merely on the state, but 
shifted to the links between the state, institutions at the grassroots and individuals as 
well as groups of individuals. By casting these focuses in a Foucauldian manner, 
greater analytical insights can be had8. 
Foucault did not cast himself as a political theorist and did not set about to 
write a coherent body of political work. Power is the leitmotiv in many of Foucault’s 
later works and he offers a large body of literature that ranges from methodological 
concerns to specific empirical studies on the origin of the human sciences (Foucault 
1994a), madness and the asylum (Foucault 1988a), medicine and clinical practice 
(Foucault 1994b), crime and penology (Foucault 1995), as well as sexuality, social 
control and the self (Foucault 1988b, 1990a, 1990b). This wide range of work cannot 
be adequately summarized and its density allows for multiple interpretations. A 
formidable array of conceptual tools is available in Foucault’s works and I have 
selectively picked the most relevant for use in this thesis. Thus what is covered is a 
small selection of Foucault’s many concerns - a deliberate decision to sacrifice 
broader analysis for the advantage of greater detail into pertinent concepts. 
 
3.1 Foucauldian Analysis of Power  
This thesis adopts Foucault’s understanding of the state as having the ability 
for both totalizing and individualizing techniques of control through pastoral power. 
This thesis adopts Foucault’s definition of power as a  
                                                 
8 It is acknowledged that there are alternative perspectives, such as Maslow (1943)’s concept of the 
hierarchy of needs, King (1975)’s model of the administrative absorption of politics, and even ecological 
changes. I have chosen the perspective of social control and a Foucauldian analysis in this thesis for its 
greater ability to explain in a nuanced way the phenomenon this thesis is examining.  
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multiplicity of force relations, … as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them, … 
as the support which these force relations find in one another, or on the 
contrary, the disjuncture and contradictions which isolate them from one 
another, and …  as strategies in which they take effect, whose general design 
or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the 
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. 
(1980:93) 
Foucault states that “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society” (Ibid.). Power is exercised in a dense 
network of relations, from countless moving points and mobile relations. Power has a 
“relational character, [where its existence] depends on a multiplicity of points of 
resistance” (Foucault 1980:95). With this understanding of power, grassroots 
organizations are understood as the most immediate, the most local power relations, 
forming a field of multiple and mobile power relations. This treatment of power throws 
into the spotlight the significance of grassroots organizations in consolidating and 
maintaining political dominance.  
Foucault sees power as situated within networks of strategic relations, 
coextensive within the social body and exercised in multiple forms and interwoven 
into many other different kinds of relations from the family to sexuality to production. 
Foucault in his earlier works had a negative theory of power, in that he saw it as the 
ability to block, obstruct or dominate. However in his later works from Discipline and 
Punish (1995), power was conceptualized positively where it is seen as productive, 
allowing for the emergence of objects and knowledge, and subjects which relate to 
specific objects and/or knowledge.  
Among his many works, Discipline and Punish is of particular significance. He 
traces the genesis of techniques of discipline and surveillance, from the torture of 
prisoners by public execution in the 16th century, to corrective penality in the 17th 
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century, and later disciplinary power through welfare in the 18th century where 
meticulous, minute control over the body is exerted to produce subjected and ‘docile’ 
bodies (Ritzer 1997:57). This found fullest elaboration in penitentiaries and other 
closed carceral spaces of the nineteenth century where an instrument used in 
disciplining power is the examination which involves a normalizing gaze. The 
examination is a crucial example of the power-knowledge nexus, where those who 
have the power to examine have the ability to acquire more knowledge and thereby 
more power. The examination focuses on the individual and makes each individual a 
case, and the individual becomes both an object of knowledge and an object of 
control. In investigating modern governance in the context of an emerging society led 
by police states, he shows that macro structural dominance depends on micro 
structures or local capillary power relations. He convincingly traces how power 
comes from below and how the macro-physical and micro-physical strands of power-
knowledge weave together to form a coherent disciplinary regime.  
Foucault thus suggests an “ascending analysis of power” (1980:99), where 
close attention is paid to the micro capillary level which is closest to the everyday life 
of subjects. With this focus, the specific mechanisms of power on bodies are made 
explicit, and extrapolation to a more general level of theorizing is possible. One 
concept that links both the macro and micro physics of power is pastoral power.  
 
3.2  Pastoral Power  
The concept of pastoral power was proposed in Foucault’s elaboration of 
Western practices of governance, with government as “the conduct of others’ 
conduct” (Foucault 1994c:xxix). Pastoral power is a form of power based on 
individualized care akin to a sheppard’s care for the flock. He traces the history of 
such a form of political rule to Plato who rejected it as beyond the capability of the 
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mortal sovereign. However, with the advent of the state in the West, the pastoral 
ecclesiastical government of the Christian Church merged with secular political 
culture, making possible the practice of pastoral power through the motto omnes et 
singulatim – of all and of each (Foucault 1994c).  
Pastoral power wielded by the state evolved from a 16th century power 
technique that used to be limited to Christian institutions such as the Church. 
Individuals who are deemed to have certain desirable religious qualities would lead 
the community or flock of believers as pastors. Pastors were required to be self-
sacrificing for his or her flock; they had the power to assure individuals of their 
salvation in the next world, and also the power to not just take care of the flock in its 
entirety but also each individual through an intimate knowledge of the individual. 
While the ecclesiastical institution of the Church has ceased or lost its vitality, 
Foucault argues that its pastoral function has spread and hybridized with the modern 
state.  
Pastoral power exercised by the modern state has specific characteristics – it 
no longer has as its aim otherworldly salvation and it is no longer practiced by 
pastors. Rather, pastoral power as practiced by the state focuses on ensuring the 
well-being of its flock in this world, with “salvation” having a changed meaning from 
deliverance and eternal life in another spiritual world to wealth, an acceptable 
standard of living and security in this world. At the same time, the “officials” of 
pastoral power increased to include the police, the family and even public institutions 
such as hospitals. Thus, pastoral power which had for centuries been restricted to a 
religious institution spread to envelop the entire social body. Akin to the fine blood 
vessels or capillaries in the circulatory system of mammals, pastoral power engages 
the vast networks of capillary institutions to crisscross the social body, forming dense 
networks and contact points in all areas.  
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From the 17th century, Foucault theorized that power over life took two forms 
– first, anatomo-politics of the human body, and second the bio-politics of governing 
populations. In the first form of anatomo-politics of the body, there is the disciplining 
of human bodies to optimize capabilities, potential for use as well as increased 
docility. Foucault in his later works focused on technologies of power and domination 
and how the body is objectified through scientific discourses (Martin et al 1988:3), 
which was related to what Foucault calls the technologies of the self: 
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves 
rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change 
themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that 
carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.  
(Foucault cited in Ritzer 1997:69) 
He seeks to examine the practices individuals perform, on volition, through either 
their own capacity or with the aid of others to transform their bodies, thought, 
conduct and “way of being” to attain a more desirable state of being (Ibid).  
The second form of power is the bio-politics of population which involves the 
governing of the population as a whole to regulate mortality, birth rates as well as 
other demographic characteristics (Ritzer 1997:67). In the 16th century, the word 
government was used to describing the directing or governing of children, 
communities and families. To govern in the broad sense is to structure the field of 
possible actions. Power relations therefore should not be looked for in violence or 
struggle but rather in government. Pastoral power as practiced by modern states 
envelops both forms of power, through the encouragement of technologies of the self, 
as well as governmentality. 
As previously elaborated, the state is often understood as a form of political 
power that looks only at the interests of the totality or a class among the totality and 
ignoring individuals. This new form of pastoral power combines in the same political 
structure of the state the ability to look after not just whole communities but each 
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individual during his or her particular lifetime. The multiplication of the aims and 
agents of pastoral power has its aim the development of knowledge of its citizens 
around two roles: one quantitative and generalized concerning the population, and 
the other analytical, concerning the individual.  
The scope of pastoral power necessitates a close scrutiny of how it works, in 
terms of how certain persons exercise power over others, and what sort of relations 
are brought into play. Foucault argues that when we mention the power of laws, 
institutions and structures, such arguments are premised on the supposition that 
certain individuals are able to exercise power over others. It is this focus on the body, 
together with a radical rethinking of power that juxtaposes Foucault’s work with 
Marxist literature and where this thesis deviates from Chua’s (1995) work.  
 
3.3 Theoretical Limitations and Implications 
There are several theoretical limitations to a Foucauldian analysis which must 
be acknowledged, of which three pertinent ones are mentioned. Firstly, one of the 
most distinctive features of Foucault’s works is their specificity, where his books 
hardly refers back to previous works, regardless of historical, conceptual, or topical 
similarities (Gutting 1994). It is not possible to provide a generalized understanding 
of his works, but rather multiple interpretations of specific aspects of his writing for 
particular purposes. Thus, the extension of his concepts – such as that of pastoral 
power – to understand contemporary concerns must be understood as divorcing a 
conceptual tool from its specific context to illuminate current concerns. Secondly, if 
power always involves strategies of domination and subjection, and all are implicated 
in practices of domination and subjection, it would be impossible to have any 
“politics-free” zone where we could be secure in the certainty of any objective 
positions (Barker 1998:37). Every social interaction would be seen as an attempt to 
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influence one’s subject position and more importantly, if we are all implicated in such 
practices of domination of subjection, Foucault has not provided adequate tools to 
distinguish between different applications of such practices. Lastly, Foucault in his 
theorizing that power is a relation and by definition always leaves open opportunities 
for resistance, strategies of resistance in his works are theoretically underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, a Foucauldian analysis has been adopted for its ability to capture the 
nuanced workings of power more satisfactorily than a Marxist framework of analysis.  
However, it is also acknowledged that differences between Foucauldian and 
Marxist works are only in terms of degree. For example, both Gramsci and Foucault 
emphasize that coercion and punishment be kept to a minimum, and what Gramsci 
terms “common sense” parallels Foucault’s conceptualization of technologies of the 
self. Nevertheless, while theoretical differences are not radical, they are significant to 
this study and will be discussed.  
In general, Foucault argues that power is much more capillary and 'micro-
physical' than previous accounts have allowed for - the modern state in its 
governance does not bear down on subjects like a heavy apparatus (cf Althusser 
1994). Rather, the state is carried by discourses produced at much more local and 
immediate levels. Published works on politics in Singapore have already been 
described as being macro-structural and state-centric. Adopting a Foucauldian 
framework, there are several theoretical implications. Firstly, as power is 
conceptualized as being everywhere, attention is moved away from the state. 
Secondly, Foucault does not deny the presence and potency of repression and 
coercion in the exercise of power, but he does deny them theoretical primacy. 
Secondly, theoretical emphasis is not given to class as a social category. Rather, 
attention is paid to individuals or “bodies” in the exercise of power. Thirdly, Foucault 
does not give the dialectics of coercion and consent much emphasis, and instead 
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choose to focus on a third aspect - normalization. Lastly, he understands ideology as 
being functional rather than encouraging false consciousness.  
3.3.1  Decentering the state  
A Foucauldian understanding of power in Singapore decenters the state, and 
calls into focus the importance of the microphysics of power, where attention must be 
paid to practices rather than institutions for a clearer understanding of the 
mechanisms of power. As Foucault sees power as circulating between bodies rather 
than a top-down, hierarchical one-way exchange, focus is removed from an analysis 
which takes as germane the seizing of State apparatuses where power is invested at 
the apex of political institutions. Rather, there will be no single site or point of 
resistance to challenge, repress and dominate. This directly challenges Marxist 
grand narratives, where there is no central node of revolt and source of revolution 
but rather a plurality of small exercises of resistance to power. Most importantly, it 
leads us to conclude that political dominance cannot be adequately understood as 
resulting from ideological consensus (Chua 1995), authoritarian modes of 
governance (Tremewan 1994), economic progress (Chalmers 1992), or institutional 
efficiency (Chan 1976).  
3.3.2 Class and Body 
Foucault does not see class as a privileged category of social action. Marxist 
ideas are found in Foucault’s works (Smart cited in Ritzer 1997:37), but Foucault 
moves beyond the economy to specific social institutions such as the prison and the 
clinic. Foucault in his understanding of power acknowledges economic 
considerations such as in the push for more efficient policing and penal policies in 
Discipline and Punish. However, he argues that in modern history there is the rise of 
a repertoire of power characterised by neutrality, rationality and invisibility that 
require new and more effective ways of political analysis.  Foucault states that power 
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and knowledge is intricately connected, and a study of knowledge production, and 
specific instances of the interplay between knowledge and power is central to the 
study of power. Power understood in the Foucauldian sense is “everywhere”, 
emanating not from a nexus where resources (either social or economic) are 
concentrated, but diffused within a population. Rather than a general concern with 
power at the level of the macro-social, Foucault focuses his attention on the 
multiplicity of minor coercion techniques aimed at normalization and the creation of 
docile bodies. For Foucault, power and hegemony pervades into every area of 
everyday life – from sexuality to health to criminality. Class is therefore important 
insofar as it impinges on the body. With this understanding, Foucault might see 
Gramsci’s understanding of discipline as socialism constructing its own ideal body, 
and disciplining it as such.  
3.3.3 Coercion, Consent and Normalization 
In a Foucauldian analysis of the exercise of power, the dialectical relationship 
between coercion and consent fades in importance. This is in contrast to works that 
adopt a Gramscian framework where coercion and consent is seen as working in 
tandem in variable and complex ways, demonstrating the intricate enforcement of 
power. Power in such works is understood as “the capacity to affect another’s 
behavior by some form of sanction. Sanctions may take the form of coercion or 
inducement … most exercises in political power include both elements” (Ball and 
Peters 2000:34).  
I suggest that a Gramscian framework is insufficient for contemporary 
analysis of Singapore politics because of its inability to capture the nuances in the 
change from ideological persuasion to welfarist overtures where this trend will be 
bluntly dealt with as another engender to gain consensus from the led. However 
using a Foucauldian framework of analysis, while the establishing of power relations 
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does not exclude the use of violence or the gathering of consent, they are not 
constitutive of the nature of power. It is apt to quote Foucault at length: 
The exercise of power is not a violence that sometimes hides, or an implicitly 
renewed consent. It operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior 
of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible 
actions; it incites, it induces … in the extreme it constrains or forbids 
absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects 
by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. 
(Foucault 1994c:341) 
Rather than an emphasis of the processes of gaining consent or coercing individuals, 
power for Foucault can be examined in the act of governance, as previously defined 
as the directing of individual conduct through normalization processes. What 
Foucault focuses on is not consent, but rather the conscious and unconscious 
normalization and self-disciplinary practices of subjects, elaborated as technologies 
of the self.  
Furthermore, civil society in Singapore while present is not robust, and a 
more accurate portrayal of resistance on the ground is provided using a theoretical 
understanding of power as being diffused and of resistance as emanating from 
everywhere. The Marxist conceptualization of revolutions through seizure of the state 
apparatus is unsuitable for Singapore’s political context where rules such as the 
Internal Security Act, the Newspaper and Printing Act as well as the Society’s Act 
curtail the freedom to form associations with political inclinations (Mauzy and Milne 
2002). Increasingly vocal individuals with no formal political affiliations have not 
expressed discontentment through organized resistances but rather individual efforts 
such as on cyberspace9.  
                                                 
9 It is acknowledged that especially over the last decade, civil society organizations and non-
governmental organizations have grown in numbers and vocality. However, many are cause-specific 
and currently do not appeal to large masses of people. As a result, their impact on local politics is still at 
present limited.  
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3.3.4 Ideologies and Discourse 
In understanding the role of ideologies in continued political dominance, 
Foucault takes a different stance from the Marxist understanding of ideologies as 
false consciousness. He is interested in the role of knowledge as useful and 
necessary to the exercise of power because they are “practically serviceable”, 
developing a methodology for the analysis of discourses. Discourse is defined as 
“identifiable collection of utterances governed by rules of construction and evaluation 
which determine within some thematic area what may be said, by whom, in what 
context, and with what effect” (Foucault 1994c:xvi). What is important to note is that 
in understanding the links between power and knowledge, they can be more usefully 
conceptualized as playing imperative and valuable roles in the conducting of human 
affairs because of their instrumental efficacy, and not because they are false 
knowledge aimed at propagating inaccurate understandings of the world that 
reproduce current status quos. 
Foucault is interested in discursive formations, or groups of statements that 
hang together in a coherent whole, subjected to rules of formation or “rules … that 
determine the conditions of possibility of all that can be said within the particular 
discourse at any given time” (Sheridan cited in Ritzer 1997:40). Discourses are 
practices that follow rules, and there is no search for the origins of a discourse, but 
the detailed description of its possibility and a systematic understanding of a 
discourse-object. Foucault is also interested in contradictions within discursive 
formations, and he argues that it is the very presence of such contractions that 
makes discourse possible. Foucault asserts that discourse is dangerous, and those 
in power seek to exercise control over those forms of discourse that they consider 
threatening (Ritzer 1997:45).  
 
44 
Foucault outlines a series of steps for the analysis of discursive events: 
1. grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence 
2. determine its conditions of existence 
3. fix at least its limits 
4. establish its correlates with other statements that may be connected 
with it. 
5. show what other forms of statement it excludes. 
(Foucault cited in Ritzer 1997:39)  
 
With these methodological steps, Foucault aimed to uncover regularities within 
discourses by finding relations between statements, groups of statements as well as 
the larger economic, political and social contexts in which they are situated. It is this 
focus on power and knowledge that is of significant interest to this thesis, and will 
structure its methodological approach in the analysis of political dominance in 
Singapore. 
The politics of discourse examines discourse in terms of the political interests 
it serves, how it participates in the politics of truth and what subject-formations are 
formed within the discourse. In examining the politics of discourse, attention must be 
given to not just the internal structure but its effects and the wider discursive field in 
which it is located. I argue that currently we are seeing the elaboration of a field, akin 
to the expansion of road networks to cover the territory one wants to domesticate 
and discipline. Rather than extending Chua’s analogy of ideological trajectory, a 
more appropriate term will be 'discursive elaboration'. This is because trajectory has 
notion of the past leading up to present but no longer present and if the term 
“discourse layering” is used, there is the notion of being buried and thus less 
significant. The use of grassroots organization is akin to the formation of a road 
network in a field, the more the better to penetrate into society to discipline the Low 
Wage Worker. The Subject of the Low Wage Worker emerges in the discourse on 
welfare, and subjects are created with events such as the signing up for national 
resource redistributive exercises such as New Singapore Shares (2001), Economic 
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Restructuring Shares (2003) and Progress Package (2006), attending retraining 
programs, as well as the request for financial aid.  
Being chronically poor even while employed or being chronically unemployed 
are new characteristics that change the Subject as previously known, causing a 
discursive shift to re-know and recapture the Subject. In the past, the regime of 
power centered on the organization and disciplining of docile bodies to produce 
submissive, productive and trained workers. However, larger macro-economic trends 
in the region and the world produced a new situation – that of structural 
unemployment. Workers trained in skills that are no longer required are retrenched, 
and there is the start of increasing discontentment from the ground which threatens 
to erode the economic base of the PAP’s political dominance. It is suggested that 
with the start of uncertain economic conditions and changing socio-political 
conditions, there is the discursive shift to pastoral welfarism and the spread of 
capillary power through grassroots networks.  
 
3.4  Pastoral Welfarism 
 Pastoral welfarism is an extension of Foucault’s notion of pastoral power. 
This term is used to describe a new mode of social control which uses welfare and 
its disbursement as channels to discipline its recipients. In many cases of social 
unrest, it is usually the discontented middle class that caused social change. 
However in Singapore, the middle class have been relatively sheltered from the 
effects of structural unemployment as seen in figures mentioned in Chapter 2, and it 
is the working class that is negatively affected by current economic trends. Thus with 
the emergence of growing numbers of the Low Wage Worker, the discursive 
elaboration to pastoral welfarism will allow for control over the discontented working 
class. 
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 Pastoral welfarism is the elaboration of the previous discourse on welfare, but 
with a significant difference in nature and degree. It aims to take care of the growing 
group of the Low Wage Worker through the collection of exhaustive, detailed 
knowledge in the disbursement of aid. I theorize the implementation of what has 
been called Workfare and ComCare as elements of pastoral welfarism, where 
grassroots organizations are the networks of capillary institutions to accumulate 
knowledge of the Low Wage Worker. It is apt to trace the discursive elaboration from 
authoritarianism to communitarianism, to what I have termed pastoral welfarism.  
3.4.1 Authoritarianism to Communitarian Democracy to Pastoral Welfarism 
Many have described the distinct ideological trajectories from the 1960s to 
the 1990s. From the creation of a “national interest” in the early 1960s before 
merger, to the dissemination of the ideologies of “survivalism” and “pragmatism” after 
Independence, and to the exhortation of Confucianism and Communitarianism in the 
1980s and early 1990s, the PAP has managed to develop and fine-tune an 
ideological system that successfully reflected first the underdeveloped material 
condition of the 1960s and later rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Chua 1995, Bell et al 1995, Chalmers 1992, Ganesan 1996, Haas 1999, Mauzy and 
Milne 2002). Underlying the PAP’s political dominance is a strong ideological 
consensus with the people based on ‘economic pragmatism’ (Chua 1995:viii).  
However, with changes in socio-economic conditions caused by past 
economic successes, initial “ideological frames” lose their currency and hold on the 
population (Chua 1995). In the 1980s, three decades of economic growth eroded the 
ideological currency of survivalism and pragmatism, and encouraged the growth of 
individualism which was seen as a harbinger of democratic demands. Once 
economic conditions became stable and livelihood of an increasingly educated 
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population was perceivably secure, the exchange of political freedom for improved 
material life weakened. A series of unpopular policy moves coupled with a growing 
sense of “deep dissatisfaction … with the style of the PAP”, summarized as 
“arrogance of power, an inflexible bureaucracy, growing elitism, and the denial of 
consultation and citizen participation in decision-making” (Chan cited in Chua 
1995:21) cost the PAP large slides in votes during the 1984, 1988 and 1991 General 
Elections.  
With declining electoral support, the PAP tried to prevent further erosion by 
institutionalizing channels of communications as well as introduce an ideology of 
communitarianism together with efforts at commencing moral education, 
Confucianism and Shared Values in 1991. With the change in Prime Minister from 
Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in 1990, the government adopted a more 
consultative style. While not discarding “survivalism” and “pragmatism”, they tried to 
forge a new consensus with the population, regaining their support with less 
governmental intervention in personal affairs, as well as greater participation and 
consultation in decision-making. A variety of reforms and initiatives such as the 
establishment of the Feedback Unit in the Ministry of Community Development in 
1985 and the creation of Town Councils in 1988 were introduced to increase the 
number of channels for political participation as well as encourage a more bilateral 
approach to governance.  
  In tracing the ideological trajectory from authoritarianism to 
communitarianism, Chua (1995) has contributed significantly to the understanding of 
PAP’s political dominance in Singapore. However as earlier argued, a Gramscian 
framework will not provide adequate analysis for the current context. Rather, with a 
Foucauldian framework, I argue that there is currently a discursive elaboration of 
communitarianism to include a welfarist turn. This requires the elaborating on a 
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discourse of welfare, divided into three periods. I argue that from the 1960s to the 
early 1990s, the discourse on welfare was essentially pragmatic, with the emphasis 
on liberalist individualist thinking that everyone should look after themselves as 
“rugged individuals” who are part of a disciplined workforce.  
Into the mid 1990s, economic uncertainties as well as increasingly visible 
income inequality were accompanied by a change in welfarist discourse, termed as 
communitarian welfarism as the economically unsuccessful was managed with a 
“many helping hands” approach. Into the 2000s, we are seeing a discursive 
elaboration to one of pastoral welfarism, where the state adopts a more active role in 
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Figure 1: Discursive Elaboration of Welfare in Singapore
aCentral Provident Fund
bHome Ownership Plus Education  
The discursive elaboration to pastoral welfarism may be understood first as a 
continued trajectory of a welfare discourse in Singapore, and secondly as a result of 
the emergence of a new subject - the Low Wage Worker - that requires a different 
discursive position on welfare to maintain political dominance10.  
                                                 
10 Again as acknowledged in Chapter 2, it is noted that the emergence of this discursive position may 
also be argued as being predisposed by ecological changes in the region.  
i re 1: isc rsive la rati  f elfare i  i a re 
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The maturation and diversification of the Singapore economy is accompanied 
by corollary social tensions and political challenges. Workfare with its emphasis on 
retraining is the broad approach of the government towards keeping Low Wage 
Workers employed in the market, especially the segment of older and less educated 
workers that lack necessary skills for high-end manufacturing jobs. Workfare targets 
the Low Wage Worker, managing their socio-economic needs for continued 
productive work or re-entry in the market. Workers who are either employed but earn 
insufficient resources for subsistence, or become unproductive due to retrenchment, 
illness, accidents or old age will be protected by ComCare. Workfare together with 
ComCare has been conceptualized as totalizing and individualizing channels of the 
government to extend its capillaries of control to the population, giving the discourse 
on welfare its pastoral element. It is pertinent to trace the lineage of both terms which 
has been recently introduced into the coterie of public metaphors in 2005. 
3.4.2 Workfare and ComCare as Elements of Pastoral Welfarism 
The first use of the term workfare in public discourse can be traced to an 
article published in Singapore’s most popular English daily, the Straits Times on the 
effects of the economic slowdown in 1998. In trying to come to terms with the rising 
numbers of retrenched and unemployed workers, the article mentioned that the 
Government shunned welfare provision but instead exhorted retraining and the 
provision of the “ultimate safety net – a job” (Straits Times 15 August 1998). It stated 
that “if there is to be no welfare, some form of workfare might be needed” (Ibid, 
emphasis added).  
  The term did not catch on in popular parlance, and no articles with this term 
were published until seven years later, during the Prime Minister’s 2005 National Day 
Rally. Touching on the issue of low-income families in Singapore, Lee discussed the 
cornerstone of PAP legitimacy, that of structural mobility and its role in maintaining 
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class cohesion in an increasingly stratified society. The government’s overarching 
response to challenges faced by Low Wage Workers is founded on Workfare which 
“reaffirms the work ethic” as individuals are encouraged to work so that they may be 
self-sufficient – in terms of being able to “own their own homes, educate their 
children, and put aside enough for their medical and retirement needs” (Ministerial 
Committee on Low Wage Workers Press Release 12 January 2006).  
Workfare reaffirms the work ethic and makes it tangible by extending benefits 
to low wage workers when they demonstrate efforts to upgrade, to find jobs 
and to stay employed. … Whereas misdirected welfare is not only ultimately 
unsustainable, it will erode the values of personal responsibility, self-reliance, 
thrift, education and hard work which have underpinned out success as a 
nation. 
(Ibid.) 
Workfare has six thrusts as represented in Diagram 2, namely rewarding work 
through a Workfare Bonus that will benefit the lowest 20% of income earners who 
are over 40 years old and earn $1,200 per month or less; enhance social support so 
that dependents will be looked after; upgrade skills of workers for better jobs; expand 
job opportunities; help children from low income families to complete their education; 
continue to redistribute budget surpluses to the lower income households and help 
low income families own their own homes.  
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(Source: Report of the Ministerial Committee on Low Wage Workers 2006:10) 
This group of Low Wage Workers is older and less educated. Their number is 
not small, and has been described as “potentially dangerous” as they might “choose 
to vent their frustration on the PAP” (Straits Times 7 January 2006). Numbering 
about 300,000, they earn less than $1,200 a month, with half of them earning only 
$900 a month. They constitute the bottom 20% of income-earners, and have 
“become a source of great concern for policy-makers, as Singapore forges ahead in 
an age of globalization, outsourcing and low-cost competition” (Straits Times 16 July 
2005). As the number of needy workers swells, the Government is facing pressure to 
move from “offering short-term transitional help that tides over workers to offering 
more long-term structural help that boosts income. Yet it has to do this without 
eroding the work ethic” (Straits Times 31 December 2005).  
 Workfare as the approach of the government to keep Low Wage Workers 
employed requires certain institutions that control and is an example of the workings 
of an anatomo-politics of the human body. The Workforce Development Agency has 
been set up to focus on adult continuing education and training (Straits Times 1 July 
     Diagram 2: Six Spokes of Workfare 
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2003). Employers pay a levy to the Skills Development Fund to support worker’s 
training, at 1% of the salary of every worker who earns below $1800. This Fund 
subsidizes courses that employers send their workers to. The National Trades Union 
Congress (NTUC) initiated the Skills Redevelopment Program to equip workers with 
new skills for jobs in other industries, the Job Re-creation Program to re-design low-
value and low-paying jobs, a $1.15 million Back-to-School Fund, the NTUC 
Surrogate Employer Program, NTUC Education and Training Fund, hardship grants, 
public-transportation and NTUC Fairprice vouchers, scholarships and bursaries to 
help its union members, especially those in low-income families (Straits Times 30 
September 2005). The Work Assistance Program and ComCare requires a “mindset 
change”, and this is conceptualized as intentional and voluntary actions by which the 
Low Wage Worker seeks to transform themselves, to change their singular being 
and set themselves rules of conduct, such as to work for at least six months so that 
they qualify for a monetary reward. Efforts to help this bottom 20% to prevent a large 
“underclass” from forming (Straits Times, 16 July 2005) alert one to the potential 
expansion of anatomo-politics of the body. 
There are thus many avenues through which the Low Wage Worker is 
disciplined to optimize his or her capabilities, of which retraining is the most 
important. Through the constant emphasis on retraining that is couched in terms of 
the inevitability of change and adaptation.  
To sustain growth, we must press on with economic restructuring. We have to 
continue to change and adapt, in order to stay competitive and vibrant. Other 
countries are rapidly transforming themselves, so we too must reinvent 
ourselves to stay ahead. Central to this strategy are our efforts to educate our 
people, and to train and re-train our workers, to keep them employable and in 
demand as the needs of industries change.  
(Lee, Straits Times 1 January 2006) 
As stated in the Workforce Development Agency website, workers will risk becoming 
structurally unemployed as the Singapore economy restructures. Their skills are no 
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longer relevant as old jobs are phased out and they lack the necessary skills for 
newly created jobs. Workers will have to adopt new skills and capabilities in order to 
stay employed (http://app.wda.gov.sg/whatwedo.asp). To govern in the broad sense 
is to structure the field of possible actions. The ideology of progress and emphasis 
on structural unemployment means that there is the constant exhortation to improve 
the Low Wage Worker’s skills, and there is no alternative means to survive in an 
increasingly competitive world.  
 This constant exhortation for retraining to pick up new skills and remain 
employable allows for a high degree of control over the body. However, it is not 
enough to be retrained. Workers are called to “embrace” and “desire” retraining, 
which I conceptualize as a form of technologies of the self.  Workers are objectified 
through pragmatic discourses of employability, and are encouraged to intentionally 
and voluntarily change their attitude towards training and lifelong learning, 
transforming themselves to be skilled workers suitable for the high-end 
manufacturing industry. As asserted,  
All Singaporeans workers … must embrace lifelong learning and have a 
constant desire to improve. It is with this spirit that our founding fathers 
overcame their challenges. It is the same spirit that will help us progress 
further. 
(Speech by Dr Ng Eng Hen, 27 October 2005) 
Even as Lee says that the approach of the government is “hard-headed and 
pragmatic” (Straits Times, 1 May 2005), the ComCare Fund launched on 28 June 
2005 to provide up to $55 million a year for assistance schemes has been seen as a 
signal of an “acceptance that many more Singaporeans than before need welfare”, 
with “grassroots groups [being] increasingly seen as a more effective way to track 
down the truly needy” (Straits Times 16 July 2005). While workfare is the approach 
of the government towards keeping Workers plugged into the capitalist system, 
ComCare addresses the socio-economic needs of needy Singaporeans. 
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 With ComCare, three categories of the needy have been created - the 
Destitute, the Transient, and the Chronic. The category of the Destitute requires 
long-term care as they have no means of support and no hope of employment due to 
age or disability. The Transient Poor are individuals who require short-term financial 
assistance due to retrenchments, accidents or illness, and are categorized as the 
“temporary or transitional” poor. The Chronic Poor, or what has thus far been called 
the Low Wage Worker, are those who require mid-term financial assistance as they 
do not earn enough to save and have difficulties paying their bills. Aid available for 
this group includes the Work Assistance Program, the Interim Financial Assistance 
and the Self-Reliance Program – all temporary and premised on the expectation that 
“the family will get back on its own feet and become self-reliant” (Straits Times 26 
August 2005). The Chronic or Low Wage Worker is the current focus of the 
government, where pastoral welfarism will allow for the start of greater social control.  
The ComCare Fund is managed by CDCs who are aided by the vast network 
of grassroots organizations as well as voluntary welfare organizations. Each of the 
84 Citizens' Consultative Committees across Singapore was given $33,000 to be 
used to provide immediate assistance to the needy (Straits Times 8 July 2005). With 
the network of capillary power in the form of grassroots organizations diffused 
through the social body to dispense ComCare assistance to the Low Wage Worker, 
potential social unrest can be preemptively dealt with. As reported,  
Upright and experienced [Citizen’s Consultative Committee] members, with 
their knowledge of the ground, are in a good position to identify needy 
residents… Residents' Committees [should] be kaypoh 11  and report and 
assist cases of needy Singaporeans. 
(Straits Times 8 July 2005) 
This official stance can be understood as an attempt to gather detailed knowledge on 
the ground through “nosey” Citizen’s Consultative Committee and Residents’ 
                                                 
11 Colloquial term for “nosey”.  
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Committee members who are familiar with their neighborhood, to institutionalize 
already available locale-specific welfare assistance schemes with a nationwide one. 
ComCare has been described as being akin to a “trampoline”, bouncing 
people “back and take advantage of opportunities for a better life” 
(www.mycs.gov.sg). It aims to provide help for the needy through schemes that 
enables them to “achieve self-reliance”, decentralize the administration of social 
assistance to community organizations so as to “better understand people’s needs”, 
and rationalize social assistance schemes so that assistance will be “simpler and 
more efficient”. The principles of ComCare as quoted reveal the discursive 
elaboration on welfare, where there is the continued use of the ideologies of self-
reliance, the family as well as the Many Helping Hands approach in dealing with the 
Low Wage Worker.  
a. Build self-reliance 
• Emphasize mutual obligation, not entitlement. Individuals 
should be prepared to help themselves. 
• Provide assistance, not welfare. 
b. Family should remain as the first line of support 
• Individuals should first reply on family support. 
c. Adopt a Many Helping Hands approach 
• Additional help will come from community groups and 
organizations such as Community Development Councils, 
grassroots organizations, Voluntary Welfare Organizations and 
self-help groups.  
(Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, 
www.mcys.gov.sg, emphasis in original) 
 
ComCare has been described as “part of a greater devolution of 
responsibilities to the community” (Straits Times, 20 January 2005), I argue that this 
devolution is not the start of a trajectory to control less, but to control better. As 
stated by Yee-Foo Yee Shoon, Mayor for Southwest CDC, 
It's not just cash that we are handing out. We will find out the cause of their 
problems, then match them to the different avenues of help. Then on top of 
that, we counsel them, and also follow up on their case where necessary. 
(Straits Times 8 July 2005) 
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In addition, it is emphasized that ComCare above all aims at normalization, 
encouraging the return to productive work and reinforcing the ideologies of self-
reliance and communitarianism. They provide structural help in a manner that shows 
that it is “abnormal” to receive aid. With ComCare, there is the spread of disciplinary 
procedures where individual visits to the poor are made.  “Judges of normality” such 
as social workers, teachers and doctors assess every individual according to a 
normalizing set of assumptions, called the “carceral network of power knowledge” 
(McNay 1994:94). ComCare aid is not a right of citizenship or an entitlement but 
rather an “obligation”; it is also not welfare but “assistance”. ComCare is an 
institutional manifestation of pastoral welfarism, and it differentiates the needy into 
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Diagram 2: Three Pillars of ComCare
 
(Source: Compiled from www.mcys.gov.sg) 
Diagram 3 shows the discursive emphasis on self reliance and financial 
independence through productive employment. “ComCare SelfReliance” emphasizes 
that all “assistance” provided is geared towards the aim of recovering self reliance 
Diagram 3: Three Pillars of ComCare 
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and provides short to mid-term help with programs that are termed “Work Assistance 
Program” and “Self Reliance Program”. These three pillars of ComCare complement 
the thrust of Workfare, and sees the consolidation of welfare provision that was 
previously absent from the 1960s to the 1990s.   
 The PAP see themselves as having a “mandate to intervene in every aspect 
of a citizen’s life that could affect national outcomes” (Straits Times 9 August 2004) 
and in times where economic challenges posed by the rise of China and India as well 
as the threats of both cyclical and structural unemployment at the end of the 1990s 
and early 2000s, pastoral welfarism allows the PAP to counter a potential political 
problem of a growing “underclass” increasingly disenchanted with the promise of 
class mobility.  It is possible to argue that in spite of the material deprivation that 
unemployment produces, this will not translate into a desire for or generate more 
radical political and social ideologies. However, persistently high unemployment 
figures may “radicalize in a more modest way, by increasing the importance that 
people attach to collectivist (such as redistributive state spending and taxation) as 
against individualist principles of social organization” (IFER Report 2002).  
Pastoral welfarism with its emphasis on decentralized management and 
grassroots support requires new institutional configurations, where welfare is 
provided as a new mode of social control. The introduction of ComCare can be read 
as a strategy to rearrange control conduits, allowing a more effective, more constant 
and more detailed operation of power which increases its effects while diminishing its 
economic and political cost. In this rearrangement, the role of grassroots 
organizations is imperative to accumulate individualizing knowledge. This thesis 
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focuses on grassroots organizations to amplify the tangible workings of pastoral 
welfarism12.  
 
  3.5 Conceptualizing Grassroots Organizations 
When examining grassroots organizations in Singapore, it must be realized 
that there is a constellation of discourse to be dealt with. They have been analyzed 
as parapolitical organizations of the ruling political party, cast as leisure-oriented 
organizations, and more recently they have been given a welfarist role. It is also 
imperative that one must not choose a form of analysis that reduces grassroots 
organizations to a mere passive and functional apparatus of the state, where each 
grassroots organization is individually scrutinized for its organizational ability.  
As mentioned, power in the Foucauldian sense is intimately connected to 
knowledge and the production of truth. The PAP government has the power to 
discursively present grassroots organizations as apolitical organizations focused on 
maintaining racial harmony and building a sense of community. What is crucial is not 
if grassroots organizations are political as lambasted in the media and Opposition 
parties, or disagreed by the PAP Government13. Reframing this within a politics of 
discourse, knowledge about grassroots organizations does not have to be evaluated 
as being right or wrong, but rather in terms of the effects of a specific understanding. 
Foucault argues that discourse has a tangible influence on events and it is this 
materiality of discourse that creates the conditions of what may be possible to say 
and what is beyond possibility. This explains the debate over the nature of 
                                                 
12 I have focused on grassroots organizations and not voluntary welfare organizations as grassroots 
organizations are government-created and funded and are thus intricately connected to the government. 
Voluntary welfare organizations on the other hand may receive funds from the government, but is 
understood as being distinct and separate from the workings of the government. This will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 5.    
13 The Worker’s Party Manifesto (2006:22) called for the abolishment of grassroots organizations as 
they served as “eyes and ears of the government” and “cripple the growth of natural community 
leadership and hinder the development of community living”.   
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grassroots organizations, where the materiality of discourse is amplified and 
experienced. As a result of contending interpretations of the nature of grassroots 
organizations, there is an “awkwardness” on the ground, where it has been deemed 
“an open secret” that community centers, and all grassroots organizations are 
“government people”, as described by many interviewed. 
Where people are now resistant towards blatant coercive control, grassroots 
organizations and their ubiquitous nature allows for the “gentle” practice of pastoral 
power rather than returning to severity akin to authoritarian rule in the 1960s and 
1970s. I contend that there is a recoding of grassroots work, where in addition to 
functioning as little rituals of mobilization by organizing events, the most important 
change is the collection of knowledge of individuals. ComCare requires house visits 
by grassroots leaders who function as apparatuses for the collection of a whole 
corpus of individualizing knowledge about needy residents who request for aid. 
Foucault describes that “information to be obtained is laid down in regulations: the 
stability of the lodging, knowledge of prayers, attendance at the sacraments, 
knowledge of a trade, morality (and ‘whether they have not fallen into poverty 
through their fault’)…” (Foucault 1995:212). Similarly, when conducting house visits, 
grassroots leaders have to fill in a form14, collecting detailed information about the 
individual’s everyday life – such as the size of the television set, the presence of air-
conditioners, the number of telephones and mobile phones, the number of children 
and aged parents, and the number of working adults.  
With the added role of welfare provision, there is greater attention to detail 
and grassroots leaders are now involved in “the supervision of the smallest fragment 
of life and the body” (Foucault 1995:140). With the ubiquity of grassroots 
                                                 
14 This form is attached as Annex A, and will be further elaborated in the later chapters of the thesis 
where a detailed description of the entire aid-seeking process is provided and analyzed.  
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organizations, there is an arrangement of a mechanism of power that will enable the 
dominant to see the smallest events that occur in the state. Organizing events that 
range from large constituency-level celebrations to small tuition classes, grassroots 
organizations are meticulous, minute, and represent a micro-physics of power. They 
are like cogs of a machine, petty mechanisms organized to ensure uninterrupted flow 
of capillary power. 
Power relations should be looked for in government, and focus will be placed 
on the vast networks of grassroots organizations which represent the capillary power 
of the state that engage in both totalizing and individualizing techniques of control, 
helping in the execution of pastoral power. Activities and events such as Yoga and 
cooking classes, Grandparents Day Dinners, Children’s Day Celebrations and block 
parties encourage technologies of the self, and now with the added welfare role, 
grassroots leaders are judges of normality as they visit homes to decide who 
receives aid. The next chapter discusses the methodology adopted in this thesis. 
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4 Methodology 
In the analysis of power relations and discourse, Foucault provides specific 
steps to guide empirical data collection. Foucault advances five propositions about 
power that has been covered in the previous chapter. First, power is not a "thing" 
that one either possesses or don’t. He sees power as being exercised in every 
relation and from all points. Second, power is not external and divorced from 
relationships of economics, knowledge, or sex. Rather, it is inside these relationships 
and determines their internal structure. Third, power is not hierarchal but is 
amorphously present at all levels of society independent of the ruling elite. Fourth, 
though it is possible to identify designs and strategies in power relationships, there 
are no individual subjects exercising this power. There is a rationality and logic 
behind power relationships, but there are no secret cabals or masterminds directing 
these relationships. Fifth, resistance is intricately connected to any power 
relationship and power cannot be understood without an acknowledgement of 
resistance that is just as amorphous.  
As power is rooted in society, in the social nexus of interactions, 
methodologically, this requires an examination of the following areas: 
1. System of differentiations: defined in terms such as status, privilege, 
linguistic capabilities and economic differences. Every relationship of power 
puts into operation and produces differences. 
2. Types of objectives: in the exercise of power, whether it be for reasons such 
as profits, trade, or assertion of authority.  
3. Instrumental mode: the means to exercise power, such as through arms, 
speech, surveillance and rules.  
4. Forms of institutionalization: i.e. structures of hierarchy that are clearly 
demarcated such as the family, military or the state that has systems of 
multiple apparatuses.  
5. Degree of rationalization: where one examines the effectiveness of 
instruments used to exercise power and the results produced and costs 




Foucault sets up four rules that serve as guidelines in his investigation on power and 
sexuality which will also guide methodological investigations in this thesis. 
1. Rule of Immanence: knowledge and power is always connected, where 
there is no neutral, objective and disinterested knowledge. All knowledge is 
information processed to influence our understanding of ourselves and 
society.  
2. Rules of Continual Variation: power does not manifest itself in static 
relations but the nature of power relationships shift over time. Power is a 
heterogeneous and uneven force whose distribution is open to continuous 
modification.   
3. Rule of Double Conditioning: all "local centers" of power are parts of larger 
strategies, and all larger strategies rely on local centers of power. The 
relation between the macroscopic and microscopic elements cannot be 
reduced to simple reciprocity or determination (McNay 1994:99).  
4. Rule for the Tactical Polyvalence of Discourse: Discourse fuses power 
and knowledge, and there is no simple dominant/dominated relationship in 
discourse, and silence does not always imply repression. Discourses that 
transmit and produce power relations are also potentially reversible. (Ibid.)  
 
These methodological guidelines will be applied to both primary and 
secondary data. Primary data were gathered from participant and non-participant 
observation as well as semi-structured interviews, while secondary data were 
collected from annual reports, monthly publications and newspaper articles. I will first 
discuss data generation techniques adopted before turning to deliberate on the 
choices of field sites selected. 
 
4.1 Data-Generation Techniques 
A Foucauldian analysis requires qualitative methodologies that allow for the 
in-depth study of many aspects of the social world. Grounded in methodologies that 
allow for flexibility and sensitivity to context, the analysis of grassroots organizations 
will be capable of capturing complexity, detail and the nuances of context, enabling 
one to construct compelling context-specific arguments about how things work and 
be able to make informed claims that have wider theoretical resonance.  
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4.1.1 Internship with the People’s Association 
The People’s Association is an important player in the grassroots network 
and it is imperative to give it adequate attention. As the main body in charge of all 
grassroots organizations, it is a rich source of data - from the administrative details of 
how information is disseminated to the practical minutiae of the daily running and 
maintenance of grassroots organizations. As described in its website, it is the 
“leading government agency that promotes social cohesion, racial harmony and 
government-to-people connectivity”, doing so with “its networks of about 1,800 
grassroots organizations” (www.pa.gov.sg). In order to gain insights into how this 
“leading government agency” manages its many grassroots organizations, a three-
month internship was requested from May to July 200515. An email was sent to the 
head of the Research and Statistics Department and after a short correspondence 
and interview, the request was accepted.  
During the internship, I was given the opportunity to visit departments 
relevant to my research and was also given access to confidential data valuable to 
my study. In addition, I was given permission to interview staff at the various 
Community Centers. Taking on the identity of a “People’s Association intern” has 
opened many otherwise inaccessible channels of information and allowed a clearer 
picture of the grassroots network to emerge. 
4.1.2 One-year Ethnographic Study 
As part of the data-generation process, I attended grassroots events both as 
a participant and a non-participant observer, experiencing events such as Children’s 
Day celebrations, basketball tournaments and Racial Harmony Day celebrations. In 
order to provide a thick description of the grassroots network, a one-year 
                                                 
15 Three months was not arbitrarily selected but a practical decision as the internship had to be done 
during the university’s term vacation.  
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ethnographic study (from January to December 2005) of one constituency, named 
Constituency S was also carried out. During the period of study, I attended a total of 
over 100 Meet-the-people sessions, various committee meetings, small parties, large 
celebrations and policy briefings for grassroots leaders16. 
4.1.3 Semi-structured Interviews  
A total of thirty interviews were arranged with grassroots leaders and staff of 
the People’s Association. Interviews were scheduled at a time and place convenient 
for participants, and all interviews followed a semi-structured format where primarily 
open-ended questions were asked17.  
 
4.2 Sampling Issues 
There is strategic purpose in selecting the sites and respondents. Theoretical 
or purposive sampling was used –choices were made based on their relevance to 
my research focus, theoretical position and analytical framework.  
4.2.1 Choice of Sites 
From the start, choices were restricted to constituencies headed by PAP MPs. 
No attempts were made to compare opposition-held and PAP wards for two reasons. 
Firstly, there are a total of only two opposition wards in Singapore – Potong Pasir 
Single Member Constituency led by Chiam See Tong, and Hougang Single Member 
Constituency led by Low Thia Kiang and it will be impossible to protect the anonymity 
of respondents from opposition-held wards. Secondly, this thesis is interested in the 
role of grassroots organizations in the maintenance of PAP’s political dominance and 
thus more significant will be the choosing of sites that are held by PAP. To protect 
the anonymity of respondents, descriptions of field sites will be kept vague. Three 
                                                 
16 A list of events attended is attached as Appendix B 
17 A sample interview guide is attached as Appendix C. 
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constituencies were chosen, named Constituency S, M and L. All three are headed 
by PAP MPs, are located close to each other, and belonged to the same 
constituency before boundaries were withdrawn in the 2001 General Elections18.  
4.2.2 Choice of Interview Participants 
Within the three constituencies chosen, there are more than thirty grassroots 
organizations, and over a thousand grassroots leaders and thus strategic decisions 
had to be made. Pilot interviews were arranged with grassroots leaders from each 
constituency to ascertain which they felt were the most important grassroots 
organizations in their constituency in their opinion and interviews were requested 
from members of the executive committees. While emails and phone calls were 
made to contact these grassroots leaders, many declined to be interviewed and thus 
the study was restricted to thirty successful interviews conducted in the three 
constituencies. 
4.2.3 Limitations of Sampling Framework 
As an attempt at qualitative studies, the sampling framework adopted was the 
most appropriate for this study. However, two limitations are acknowledged. Firstly, 
the decision to observe only PAP-held wards might have caused the study a 
valuable insight into the interactions between different power relations – grassroots 
organizations aiding the resistance of rather than maintaining PAP dominance. 
Cross-comparisons in power structures and subject positions created in the local 
grassroots networks might have produced interesting data. Secondly, the study was 
also restricted to grassroots leaders who are still active participants, and no 
interviews were had with those that had left. This group of ex-grassroots leaders 
might be able to provide a rich source of data where power relations might have 
been dissatisfactory. They may also be operationalized as the “failure” of channels of 
                                                 
18 Fieldwork was completed before the 2006 General Elections.  
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capillary power, providing fascinating nuances to the understanding of the concept of 
pastoral power.  
 
4.3 Ethical Considerations 
There are different levels of involvement and roles adopted in the field can be 
arranged on a continuum by the degree of involvement or detachment of the 
researcher with his or her participants. At one extreme, there is the researcher as 
detached observer, an outsider to the field he or she is studying. The other extreme 
where the researcher is described as “going native” refers to the stage when the 
researcher becomes an intimately-involved insider. Both extremes are problematic, 
with the former position opening itself to criticism on its inability to capture the 
nuances of participants’ experiences and the latter being denigrated as producing 
unreliable and questionable analysis due to over-involvement.  
Being involved in grassroots work for over four years, I run the risk of being 
labeled as a complete participant (Junker 1960), or complete member (Alder and 
Alder 1987). I have a close relationship with my research participants and setting, but 
it is imperative to note that it is this involvement in grassroots work that fuelled later 
sociological interest that fostered an attitude of strangeness towards my personal 
participation in grassroots work. While it is inevitable that such close involvement 
might cast doubts on the researcher’s ability for neutral analysis, I argue that 
neutrality is ideal but impossible in research settings. The challenge of this study is to 
demonstrate that personal interest did not bias the study. What I strove for was 
objectivity and honesty in presenting data. This involvement gave me the opportunity 
to closely examine the workings of grassroots organizations and provide the reader 
with an emic understanding of the dynamics involved in grassroots work. In addition, 
relationships nurtured over the years allowed the gathering of honest opinions that 
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would otherwise be unavailable for those not involved in the close-knit grassroots 
network. 
 
4.4 Methodological Limitations of Foucauldian Analysis 
As with all studies, the thesis has methodological limitations as a result of the 
adoption of a Foucauldian framework in its analyses. It has been discussed 
previously that if power always involves strategies of domination and subjection, and 
all are implicated in practices of domination and subjection, it would be impossible to 
have any “politics-free” zone where we could be secure in the certainty of any 
objective positions (Barker 1998:37). This presents a methodological concern – if we 
are all implicated in the practice of domination and subjection, how can we 
distinguish between different applications of these practices? It would be impossible 
to distinguish between the dominating practices of a teacher applied to his or her 
students, and the dominating practices of the prisons officers applied on prisoners. 
Methodological observations of various practices of domination and subjection would 
thus be conceptually indistinct.  
In addition, Foucault’s focus on Subjects and the Body in the analysis of 
power under-appreciates the significance of class as a category of social action. The 
Subject of the Low Wage Worker may well form a distinct class of society, but the 
lack of conceptualization means that fieldwork observations in the area of class 
consciousness and material dissatisfaction is relegated to being of secondary 
importance and cannot be adequately captured and understood within the overall 
theoretical framework. Nevertheless, the thesis has adopted a Foucauldian approach 
to analysis due to its ability to richly capture nuanced workings of power.  
The next chapter provides a detailed mapping of grassroots organizations as 
capillary power in Singapore. 
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5 Micro Physics of Power 
This thesis has thus far argued that with changing economic and socio-
political conditions, the PAP has shifted strategies to manage increasing 
disenfranchisement among a “growing constituency of the poor” (Straits Times 29 
January 2005). Under the third Prime Minister, we are starting to see a discursive 
elaboration, where the previous ideology of communitarian democracy is 
complemented by pastoral welfarism, where there will be control right down to the 
depths of society, not just between the state and society, or at the frontier between 
classes (Foucault 1995:27). Chapter three examined the agents of normalization 
involved in the implementation of Workfare as an element of pastoral welfarism. 
Through an examination of grassroots activities, this chapter examines another 
group of agents of normalization, detailing the micro physics of power and looking at 
the intricate workings of pastoral welfarism at the grassroots level. 
Using a Foucauldian framework, it is possible to see the tactical importance 
of grassroots organizations. The Grassroots Leader is a specific subject position 
created within the discourse of grassroots and community. Like pastors who ensure 
the well-being of the flock, grassroots leaders ensure the well-being of the 
community, looking after the community’s physical amenities, as well as the more 
intangible sense of community spiritedness among the residents. With inter-
membership and numerous jointly-organized events, grassroots organizations 
crisscross the social body to form dense networks and contact points. They are akin 
to communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that 
subjugate bodies by turning them into objects of knowledge. Events such as 
Grandparents’ Day celebrations and Parents’ Day Dinner serve to reinforce the 
ideology of the family and “filial responsibility”, and community job fairs emphasize 
the importance of self-reliance. Through such events, grassroots activities involve 
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the anatomo-politics of the body, disciplining them to optimize capabilities and 
increase docility. Grassroots leaders then become agents of normalization when they 
organize such activities that reinforce ideologies and social norms.  
As “microphysics” is a study of the forms and means of power on individuals 
and the details of their behavior and conduct, the focus is placed on the analyses of 
practice over the analyses of institutions19, with emphasis on interactions among 
individuals in specific situations to see local capillary circuits of power. Two specific 
contexts which are fruitful for discussion are that of management of utility bill arrears 
and the process of managing them; as well as the disbursement of Citizen’s 
Consultative Committee ComCare Funds. Analysis will not be systemic or structural 
but on specific forms of subjection and domination. 
 
5.1 Capillary Power: Examining Grassroots Organizations 
Grassroots organizations are found in many settings and have single or 
multiple functions. It is thus difficult to give a precise definition of a term with many 
meanings. “Grassroots” is usually used to describe any base-level organization that 
is not centrally organized. Existing literature by and large use this term to describe 
organizations that are largely independent of state influence, non-profit, voluntary 
citizen’s groups organized on a local level to address specific issues for public good 
and also perform services such as bringing concerns to governments, monitor policy 
and encourage participation at the community level (Smith 2000:ix). There is a 
general consensus that they work as buffers against state power, and are located 
between individuals and the state. In sum, the term has a positive and democratic 
overtone, alluding to citizen participation where people organize themselves to 
                                                 
19 A brief summary of the various grassroots organizations is attached as Appendix D. 
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aggregate resources and effect action (Chekki 1979, Handy 1988, Adedeji and Otite 
et al 1997, Diokno et al 1997, Harrison 2000).  
In Singapore, terms such as grassroots organizations, voluntary welfare 
organizations as well as nongovernmental organizations require clarifications. While 
all three types of organizations are non-profit and are mainly made up of volunteers, 
they differ in three essential aspects, i.e. genesis, target clientele and relationship 
with the state. A voluntary welfare organization as defined by the Ministry of 
Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS) is 
A non-profit-making, voluntary set-up governed by an elected volunteer board. 
It promotes and provides social and community services in financial, 
emotional, educational, health and social aid and support. A [voluntary 
welfare organization] caters for those in need, distress or at-risk and helps 
the disadvantaged and disabled to be independent. It is driven by a strong 
spirit of volunteerism. A [voluntary welfare organization] works with volunteers, 
government authorities, public and private organizations and the community.   
(www.mycs.com.sg) 
 
The national coordinating body of member Voluntary Welfare Organizations is the 
National Council of Social Services which provides directions and funding for 
member Volunteer Welfare Organizations. These organizations are usually seen as 
partners of the state to provide social services that the latter does not, and 
complement available social support for the needy. Nongovernmental organizations 
may receive funding from the government, but do not come under the National 
Council of Social Services. In many instances, the defining characteristic of a 
nongovernmental organization is its institutional separation from the government and 
ideological stance that might differ from the government’s.  
Grassroots organizations on the other hand are defined by its institutions and 
its peculiar genesis. In the Singapore Yearbook of Statistics, a section collating 
statistics on community services in Singapore defined grassroots organizations as 
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those belonging to the People’s Association20(see for example Singapore Yearbook 
of Statistics 2005:268), i.e. government-created and funded nonprofit voluntary 
associations that have fixed geographical interests. They have an official 
membership-base of volunteers who are residents or people with established 
interests (such as businesses) in each geographical area, and are aided by staff 
from the People’s Association21, a statutory board helmed by the Prime Minister. Key 
position holders in each grassroots organization are elected by the Member of 
Parliament, who is also the Advisor to grassroots organizations in that constituency. 
Grassroots organizations cater to residents in the specific geographical area and 
promote activities which are in line with current Government exhortations.  
5.1.1 Describing the Grassroots Network 
The grassroots network in Singapore is large, encompassing many different 
types of organizations catering to specific populations. As at 25 May 2005, there was 
1642 grassroots organizations, summarized in Table 5. 
                                                 
20  The organizations listed are the Citizen’s Consultative Committees, Community Centre/Club 
Management Committees, Residents’ Committees, Neighborhood Committees, Malay Activity 
Executive Committees, Indian Activity Executive Committees, Senior Citizens’ Executive Committees, 
Youth Executive Committees, Women’s Executive Committees, Civil Defense Executive Committees, 
Constituency Sports Clubs, Teens Network Clubs, Area Sub Committees and Community Centre/Club 
Building Fund Committees. 
21  There is the exception of CDCs, whose scope is much larger and generally are not seen as 
grassroots organizations, but rather as institutions working closely with grassroots organizations at the 
grassroots level.  
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Table 5: Number of various Grassroots Organizations 
Grassroots Organization Number 
Area Subcommittees 42 
Community Centres/ Clubs 104 
Community Centre Management Committee 104 
Citizen’s Consultative Committee 84 
Civil Defence Executive Committee 84 
Constituency Sports Club 84 
Indian Activities Executive Committee 89 
Malay Activities Executive Committee 95 
Neighborhood Committee 100 
Resident’s Committee 544 
Senior Citizen’s Executive Committee  102 
SSC 4 
T-Net Club 8 
Women’s Executive Committee 104 
Youth Executive Committee 94 
Source: People’s Association Intranet, as at 25 May 200522 
Numbers of grassroots organizations change over the years, with some created, 
some terminated, and others reorganized. For example, Community Resource 
Volunteers, a scheme introduced in 1987 stopped after a few years, with little 
information available. Ladies’ Club as well as Young Resident’s Club were also 
created as sub-groups of the Resident’s Committee, but never developed in any 
significant way. These more “obscure” grassroots organizations are not captured in 
the Singapore yearly statistical review, and are not factored in the calculation of 
grassroots organizations.  
Existing grassroots organizations are organized according to constituency 
drawings which change during every General Election. After the 2001 General 
Elections, Singapore was divided into the following constituencies (Diagram 1). 
                                                 
22 Figures maintained by Field Secretariat and Logistics and Estates Management Division. 
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 Source: www.gov.sg 
Grassroots organizations vary across constituencies, but in general the network 
within each constituency is similar. Every constituency has a Citizen’s Consultative 
Committee that overseas all other grassroots organizations 23 , as well as a 
Community Center Management Committee that looks after the community centre. 
The Member of Parliament acts as Advisor to the grassroots organizations in each 
constituency and is closely aided by the chairperson of the Citizen’s Consultative 
Committee and Community Center Management Committee. The Citizen’s 
Consultative Committee organizes events at the constituency level, and is in charge 
of community and welfare programmes. Within each Citizen’s Consultative 
                                                 
23  Although the Citizens’ Consultative Committee is acknowledged by the PA as the head of all 
grassroots organizations, fieldwork in the three constituencies suggest that many grassroots leaders 
feel both the Citizens’ Consultative Committee and the Community Centre Management Committee are 
of equal standing, with the Community Club Management Committee in charge of maintaining the 
Community Club and leading the Community Club subgroups, and the Citizens’ Consultative Committee 
managing the Residents’ Committees and other none-Community Club based organizations.  
SMC: Single Member Constituency 
GRC: Group Representative Constituency 
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Committee members are divided into various subgroups, of which the most important 
is Welfare. Constituency-specific and sometimes ad hoc, sub-groups can range from 
Area Subcommittees (managing of commercial areas within the constituency) to 
Drug Abuse Prevention Subcommittee to Dengue Fever Prevention Subcommittee.  
The Community Centre/Club Management Committees maintains and 
manages the constituency’s community centre or club, from which they organize 
activities through the various sub-groups to promote racial harmony and a sense of 
community. Meetings are held every month, with the Residents’ Committees holding 
theirs at their respective centers in the void deck, and the Community Centre sub-
groups having theirs in the Community Centre/Club. Sub-groups within the 
Community Centre Management Committee have specific target audience, such as 
the Senior Citizens Executive Committee organizing Grandparents Day Celebrations 
and one-day tours for senior residents, and the Indian Activities Executive 
Committee holding Indian Dance and Tamil story-telling competitions to cater to the 
Indian ethnic group.  
The Residents’ Committees have been called the “backbone” or the “hands 
and feet” of the grassroots network by many respondents for their intimate 
knowledge of the constituency. Based outside the Community Club/Centre, their 
scope for outreach is the greatest, and many activities are organized to suit the 
specific demography of each zone. From acupuncture courses to tuition classes, 
Residents’ Committees are the most visible grassroots organization to residents due 
to the close proximity of the organization to homes. Neighborhood Committees are 
the equivalent of Residents’ Committees in private estates, and are only loosely 
linked to the rest of the People’s Association grassroots organizations. Smaller 
grassroots organizations such as the Constituency Sports Club and the Civil Defense 
Executive Committee while based at the Community Centre/Club do not fall under 
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the direct purview of the Community Centre Management Committee but sits into 
Citizens’ Consultative Committee meetings. The diagram below summarizes the 
general grassroots network. 
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CDCs have a larger focus than the other grassroots organizations which the 
People’s Association manages. On 24 November 2001, CDCs were restructured 
from nine to five (Diagram 3). Taking over the administration of social assistance 
schemes from the Ministry of Community Development Youth and Sports (MCYS) as 
well as the National Council of Social Services since 1 April 2001, CDCs are 
organizations that whilst are under the People’s Association, work at a level larger 
                                                 
24 I have included Town Councils and Housing and Development Board Branch offices in this diagram 
because of the close working relationships these organizations have with grassroots organizations. In 
fieldwork across all three constituencies, respondents mentioned that they worked “hand in hand” with 
such local governmental agencies, and thus my inclusion in this diagram.  
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than the grassroots as the geographical boundaries encompass several 
constituencies. Each CDC is managed by a Council comprising a Mayor and 
members which ranges from 12 to 80 members who are appointed by the People's 
Association Chairman or Deputy Chairman. CDCs disburse various community and 
social assistance services delegated from Ministries, and function as a local 
administration of its District. They are responsible for the planning, implementing and 
managing of community programmes that promote bonding and social cohesion. 
















These organizations, together with many other unique ones created in 
specific constituencies to tackle local problems, represent the vast grassroots 
networks in Singapore. While not everything is the state, the state permeates 
everywhere with such institutions extending capillary power and becoming agents of 
normalization. As capillaries emanating pastoral power, I next turn to the intricate 









5.2 Pastoral Welfarism Examined 
 An emic understanding of the grassroots network requires a close study of 
the dynamics between grassroots leaders in their planning and execution of 
grassroots events, social services and welfare disbursement. The thirty interviews 
conducted across three constituencies, together with the one-year ethnographic 
study of one constituency –Constituency S - has allowed for a detailed grasp of the 
complexities involved in the engagement amongst grassroots leaders. 
 A close examination of the grassroots network reveals several characteristics. 
The objective capacity of grassroots organizations is high, in terms of funding and 
manpower. Constituency S has a total of 17 grassroots organizations, all of whom 
have access to their own savings accumulated over the years, and schemes such as 
the Matching Grant from People’s Association where the government matches dollar 
for dollar spent on activities promoting racial harmony keeps the coffers filled. There 
is thus a strong ability to effect action and events. Communication within the 
grassroots network is high, as grassroots leaders have close personal relationships 
among themselves. Mobile phone numbers and residential numbers are easily 
retrieved from the Senior Constituency Manager at the Community Club, and 
information is transmitted without much trouble. Outside the network, communication 
with the community is done through the distribution of leaflets via Residents’ 
Committees, the displaying of banners and posters, and the organizing of specific 
events such as Dengue Fever Prevention Roadshows. Power relations as modes of 
actions that act upon the actions of others can be seen in everyday interactions with 
residents. The next section details fieldwork down in Constituency S.  
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5.2.1 Constituency S 
 Constituency S25  is a small constituency which has been helmed by the 
current Member of Parliament for the past 14 years since 1991. It is a typical satellite 
town, located away from the central business district. A self-contained “heartlands” 
area, it has about 170 blocks of mostly four-room flats, no rental flats and just one 
condominium. There are a total of about 32,500 residents who are serviced by a 
mass rapid transit station, a bus interchange, a shopping centre, two major 
neighborhood markets, seven schools (primary and secondary), a small community 
library as well as many grassroots organizations. It has one modern Community Club, 
and nine Residents’ Committees spread across the constituency. The Citizen’s 
Consultative Committee and the Community Club Management Committee together 
with their sub-groups are based at the Community Club, and all these organizations 
together with the estimated 330 grassroots leaders make up the dynamic grassroots 
network in Constituency S (Diagram 4). Cross-membership keeps the networks tight, 
and grassroots leaders are characterized by long years of service.  
 
                                                 
25 A map of the constituency with names of roads and buildings erased is provided as Appendix E. This 
will provide a mental picture of the area being studied.  
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It is common for grassroots leaders to hold multiple posts and their workload 
is heavy. One even commented that it feels like “doing full-time work on a part-time 
basis”. It is not the intention of many interviewed to accumulate posts, but many were 
given added responsibilities and multiple portfolios due to the small number of 
individuals who were willing to commit time to grassroots work. In the study, none 
doubted their continued relevance to residents in their community. Many spoke of 
residents recognizing them and approaching them for help, akin to the village head 
during the kampong days of rural Singapore. As one Residents’ Committee chairman 
says  
I think… what I feel is … being an [Residents’ Committee] chairman, 
especially if you move around at your zone, all the residents know you, they 
greet you, talk to you, whenever there’s problem they come to you, seek for 
your help. I … just feel like … a kampong chief. 
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Yet another affirms the grassroots organization’s relevance to residents in the 
community, this time using the metaphor of being “half a government”. Due to the 
close relationship that grassroots organizations have with government agencies and 
the Member of Parliament (MP) of their constituency26, residents have no qualms 
approaching grassroots leaders for help first. As one grassroots leader says, 
… we are sort of like bua cheng hu you know? Because residents have 
anything, they look out for us. They need help, they take us like “ei, li xi 
kampong tao leh. Wa lai chuey li”. Then you can dao ka chiu. Yes of course, 
we have the direct contact with Town Council, HDB, we can help them along, 
we can even advise them when is the best time to see MP27. 
 
This sentiment shows that grassroots leaders see themselves as being functionally 
useful to residents in the community. Many interviewed expressed a firm 
commitment to their residents, organizing activities they know that are popular with 
many. Such activities are the focus of grassroots leaders, who look forward to 
organizing the next one once the current activity is successfully completed. They see 
themselves as organizing leisure activities for residents during their spare time, and 
with block parties or lantern festivals, a sense of community and fun is injected into 
the neighborhood. One grassroots leader even saw grassroots organizations as 
morale boosters for residents who might be feeling unhappy about the current high 
costs of living and hectic way of life. Grassroots Leaders as “kampong tao” (village 
head) and “bua cheng hu” (half government) looking after and helping residents is a 
very tangible expression of the pastoral nature of grassroots leaders and the 
capillary circuits of power at the microphysical level. Power relations are also brought 
into play – subject positions such as Organizer and Participant, Grassroots Leader 
                                                 
26The MP is also Advisor to grassroots organizations 
27 This quotation faithfully reproduces what the grassroots leader said in English liberally interspersed 
with Hokkien. Loosely translated, he says “we are sort of like half-government you know? Because 
residents have anything, they look out for us. They need help, they take us like “hey, you are our 
kampong head. I come and look for you”. Then you can help me. Yes of course, we have the direct 
contact with Town Council, HDB, we can help them along, we can even advise them when is the best 
time to see MP”. 
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and Resident, as well as “kampong tao” (village head) convey the flows of power 
within the network.  
While grassroots leaders see themselves as being functionally important, it is 
not all a picture of happiness and never-ending successful activities. The feel of 
grassroots organizations on the ground has been one of a certain “functional” decay. 
Many commented that it is increasingly difficult to get participants, costs of 
organizing events are rising, and there should be a renewed emphasis for grassroots 
organizations to make sure that activities are catered to specific interests of their 
residents, rather than on profitability. Those who have volunteered for many years 
weaved nostalgia about the past when they felt that residents were more receptive to 
activities and were easily contented with whatever was organized. As one grassroots 
leader laments, “no goodie bags, fantastic programs and lucky draws, no residents”.  
There is the general opinion that grassroots work is now an uphill struggle, 
where grand programs have to be organized together with attractive lucky draw 
prizes and freebies to entice demanding residents to participate. In the past, 
newspaper-collecting was the most lucrative way to earn revenue for grassroots 
organizations such as the Residents’ Committee. Residents would freely support the 
Residents’ Committee by donating their used newspapers, and door-to-door selling 
of tickets were warmly received. Residents’ Committees were profitable 
organizations with high-yielding fixed deposits, popular tuition courses that generated 
modest monthly income, and good participation rates for minimal-cost activities.  
Over the years, newspaper-collecting as a source of income changed to the 
organizing of pasar malams (night markets). Tuition classes that were once popular 
with children have competitors in the form of private tuition centers or even churches 
who run free tuition classes. Residents now have other leisure choices and 
participate in grassroots activities only if there are attractive prizes and interesting 
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games with token registration fees. Thus the costs of organizing activities have gone 
up, while income from running tuition classes and organizing yearly pasar malams28 
decreases. Coupled with falling membership rates, the state of grassroots 
organizations in general can be described as being one of stagnation or even decline. 
Some remarked during interviews that they had to attend meetings where they were 
“scolded” for using too much funds and they felt that heading a grassroots 
organizations is now akin to running a company, with costs at the top of their mind.  
Many expressed unhappiness about the current state of affairs, but seem doggedly 
determined to continue with grassroots work, with many citing friendships as a 
reason for their perseverance.  
Appreciating the friendships formed over many years of volunteering with the 
same group of people, such ties allows individuals participants to find meaning in the 
activities involved in grassroots, and also keep the network tight. A sense of the 
lasting nature of the network is gleaned when one looks at the understanding of 
informal seniority amongst members. Informants mention that to be called a “senior” 
grassroots leader require more than fifteen to twenty years of service before that 
respect will be accorded by fellow members. Five years is a short time to be in 
grassroots, and at ten years of service, “you are just starting out”. There are 
schemes in place to reward long service, such as the People’s Association 5, 10, 15, 
20 and 25-year Long Service Awards for grassroots leaders. Notwithstanding the 
camaraderie that is present in the network, there is also tension amongst grassroots 
leaders.  
 
                                                 
28 The organizing of pasar malams brings along its own problems, such as bounced cheques from 
merchants when rainy seasons affect sales. Restrictions from People’s Association such as capping the 
number of pasar malams that can be organized each year, together with local Citizens’ Consultative 
Committee regulations make pasar malams a difficult and tenuous source of income.  
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5.2.2 Tension within the Network 
The multiplicity of force relations is amplified when one investigates tensions 
within the grassroots networks. Ceaseless struggles are obvious to those within the 
network, with tales of arguments and clashes of character between members of the 
same or across grassroots organizations. This paints a picture of the complex 
strategical situation within the network where power traverses multiple points of 
resistances. Grassroots leaders assume different positions in the network of power 
and formal institutional positions within the network is generally as follows 
1. Chairperson 
2. Vice-chairperson (Up to three in several committees) 
3. General Secretary 
4. Treasurer 
5. Assistant secretary (Up to three in several committees) 
6. Assistant treasurer 
7. Auditor 
8. Member  
9. Observer 
Most grassroots leaders sit in multiple organizations and hold different 
positions in each. Power is circulated among subjects through the creation of ad hoc 
committees with specific subject positions. Power relations are formed, implicating all 
bodies in their practice. One grassroots leaders might be the Treasurer of one 
grassroots organization, but be the chairperson of an ad hoc committee formed to 
organize a Children’s Day Carnival, and another grassroots leader who is 
Chairperson of yet another grassroots organization might be tasked as the secretary 
of the same ad hoc committee.  
There are some standardized practices, where for example, all Residents’ 
Committee Chairpersons are members of the Citizen’s Consultative Committee; and 
the Chairman of the Citizen’s Consultative Committee is the Vice-Chairman of the 
Community Centre Management Committee and vice versa. Such formal institutional 
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positions within the network are open to contestations, for they represent nodes of 
power flows. Grassroots Leader “Bob” is in a grassroots organization that was 
chaired by the same person “Frank” since its formation more than fifteen years ago. 
Over the years, Frank has shown less than satisfactory leadership and refused to 
relinquish chairpersonship. With the introduction of a compulsory limitation of tenure, 
Frank stepped down four years ago and Bob became Chairperson of the grassroots 
organization. Two terms into his role as Chairperson, Bob has been actively 
nurturing the Vice-Chairpersons in his grassroots organization. He says,  
He’s [Frank] my chairman from the beginning. If People’s Association didn’t 
come out with the 6-year term, I think he is still the chairman. In fact, most of 
the time, I’m the one who help him to organize, work like shit, get all my 
members… to do things. And then, he’s the one only talk, when MP come, 
just show MP, “see we’ve done this, we’ve done that” and the chairmen 
behind all pointing the middle finger at him.  In fact some members actually 
ever come to me, say “you work like shit, and when [Member of Parliament] 
come, [Member of Parliament] didn’t even mention your name, only mention 
Frank. So why do you want to do until… work like shit for people, and then 
people don’t appreciate?” I say, “as long as the residents appreciate, I’m 
happy”. 
 
Frank was ridiculed as a “photo opportunist”, one who appeared only when 
the Member of Parliament was around with a photographer in tow. Frank by holding 
on to chairpersonship for too long has generated ill will among his fellow members. 
Bob is a well-respected businessman and chairman, and heads a very active 
grassroots organization. As he has a wife who is supportive of his grassroots 
involvement, he could focus on running his organization well and gradually, he 
earned the reputation of being an able leader. Currently in his late forties, he is 
young for a grassroots leader. He now serves his third and last term as Chairperson, 
and has three vice-chairpersons who are being groomed for the position of Chairman 
after his third term ends.  
In addition, National Day Awards such as the Public Service Star (PBM), and 
Bintang Bakti Masyarakat (BBM) add a certain amount of friction to volunteers. The 
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PBM and BBM are coveted National awards for volunteers, and awards are limited to 
two per constituency. While the criteria for National Day Awards were not given due 
to issues of confidentially when interviewing the Field Secretariat in the People’s 
Association, it was understood that there was a minimum qualifying period as well as 
criteria to measure the degree of contribution by grassroots leaders. The flow of 
power is not even within the network and concentrates at particular nodes such as 
the Citizen’s Consultative Committee and Community Centre Management 
Committee. An indicator of relative importance among organizations is their inclusion 
in awards. National Day Awards are open to all members in the Citizen’s 
Consultative Committee and Community Club Management Committee but only key 
position holders in other grassroots organizations such as the Residents’ Committee 
and Youth Executive Committee qualify.  
Resistances can be seen both amongst grassroots leaders, as well as in 
matters involving directives from the People’s Association. Faced with heavy 
responsibilities, many grassroots leaders expressed annoyance at new requirements 
from the People’s Association, such as the reporting of the opening hours of a 
Residents’ Committee, or new regulations on account-keeping. One interviewee said 
that 
… we are volunteers, we are here to do grassroots work, we are not here to 
do paperwork. If you want us to do the paper work, employ us! Are we 
grassroots leaders or grassroots workers? 
 
In addition to mundane “bureaucratic” requirements from the People’s Association, 
the clashes of character when organizing events also amplify complex strategical 
relations. An event studied in detail during the period of fieldwork was a large event 
to celebrate Children’s Day at the constituency level. About three months before the 
event, the Citizen’s Consultative Committee Chairman formed a subcommittee to 
organize it, with himself as Chairperson. Involving all Residents’ Committee 
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chairperson and key members of the Citizen’s Consultative Committee such as the 
Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Treasurer, bi-weekly meetings were held to 
discuss details of the event. Within this subcommittee, finer division of labour was 
arranged, with small groups in charge of matters such as crowd control, lucky draw 
prices, program, food, and logistics. As mentioned by an informant, 
They [Citizen’s Consultative Committee Chairman and a particular grassroots 
leader] both don’t get along. In the past [grassroots leader] was in charge of 
this event, and it was always hugely successful because he had connections 
with the local merchants who would sponsor prizes and food for the event. He 
also had a core group of supporters who are retired aunties who would 
devote their time to this event. But then too bad, this guy got arrogant, and 
became difficult to work with. Think he so zai29, always so successful, and 
huge crowd turnouts at his event. So [Citizen’s Consultative Committee 
Chairman] felt it was unhealthy, so decided this year to use another group of 
people with himself as Chairperson. There is a lot at stake, to prove to 
everyone he can also draw the crowd.  
 
Grassroots leaders who plan and organize specific events over the years can gain a 
reputation in the community for that event, and can also begin to form a relatively 
more influential node within the broader grassroots network. When these informal 
power relations threaten to supersede formal institutional positions within the network, 
measures are taken to correct the situation, in this instance the removal of the 
grassroots leader from heading the organization of the Children’s Day Carnival 
Organizing Committee by the Citizen’s Consultative Committee Chairperson in 
consultation with the Member of Parliament. Such tensions between grassroots 
leaders give the grassroots network in Constituency a certain dynamism when there 
are events and events organized throughout the year.  
5.2.3 Grassroots Events as Normalizing Events 
 
Grassroots organizations organize events to encourage certain forms of 
behavior - behavior that builds community spirit and maintains social cohesion, racial 
harmony and Government-to-People connectivity (www.pa.gov.sg). Building 
                                                 
29 Colloquial term which means capable; efficient.  
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community spirit may be understood as reinforcing the ideology of communitarianism. 
Residents who participate in leisure activities such as Lantern Festivals, Block 
parties, End of Year bashes, Children’s Day Carnival and even Lion Dance 
competitions are hailed as Subjects of the Community and State, and in the 
individualizing experience of registration and collection of goodie bags where they 
reaffirm their individual identities as residing in a particular block within the 
constituency, they are also engaged in totalizing practices of “community-bonding” 
and affirmation of the community. Large public grassroots events can be understood 
as political rituals, as ceremonies in which power is manifested (Foucault 1995:47). 
Events are spectacles in which power is displayed in terms of the logistical ability to 
plan and orchestrate the event, as well as the capability of gathering the masses. 
Nothing amplifies the operation of power as much as the ability to gather bodies, to 
summon them as spectators (Foucault 1995:58). But just as punishments were 
public spectacles that encouraged illegality and ran the risk of being rejected by the 
people to whom they were addressed, where criminals became heroes because the 
powerless felt threatened, grassroots events can be “subverted” by people who stay 
not to observe the show of power but to gain from the free goodie bags given out, the 
free food, and to be entertained. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that it is the 
absence of attendance that is a problem for surveillance, where as long as residents 
stay, surveillance is possible.  
In the year fieldwork was conducted in Constituency S, there was a 
grassroots event every month, large or small. A list of events organized is attached 
as Appendix B and shows the seemingly never-ending hum of grassroots activities to 
attract residents. Smaller events include block parties and On-the-Spot Art 
competitions organized by Resident’s Committees, medium-sized decentralized 
events such as simultaneous Lantern Festival celebrations at all Residents’ 
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Committees, to large constituency-level celebrations such as Children’s Day and 
Resident’s Day Carnival. These events might include the Member of Parliament as 
Guest of Honour, or the Chairman of the Citizen’s Consultative Committee might 
grace the event. Many large events would involve organizations beyond grassroots – 
for example, schools within Constituency S would be invited to give Wushu and 
Silat30 demonstrations, perform Malay and Modern Dances, as well as Rock Band 
and Handbell performances. Most large events would also have a section reserved 
for government agencies such as the National Environment Agency, Housing and 
Development Board and the Town Council. Resident by attending such large 
grassroots event can gather information on issues such as compulsory changing of 
window rivets or the prevention of the spread of dengue fever. 
It is the focus on providing not just entertainment but also relevant information 
for residents that show the pastoral nature of grassroots organizations. Bingo games, 
henna painting booths and science exhibits serve to entertain the Resident, but also 
by attending the event residents reaffirm their membership in the community, and 
interact with agents of normalization from grassroots organizations, the Town 
Council, the Housing and Development Board Branch Office, as well as the 
Neighborhood Police Center. Being told that certain actions such as wearing short 
skirts or using expensive mobile phones while walking home at night encourage 
crime to be committed, that bamboo pole holders should be covered to prevent water 
from collecting and becoming mosquito-breeding grounds, and that all home owners 
must change their window rivets to approved steel ones require a change in the Self, 
and encourage technologies of the self. Such events thus act as normalizing events 
for residents, reinforcing communal norms.  
                                                 
30 Wushu and Silat are traditional Chinese and Malay martial arts respectively. 
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 In addition to having such events, there are other activities that serve to keep 
residents under surveillance. More penetrative are block visits, organized by the 
constituency’s People Action’s Action branch and assisted by grassroots leaders. 
Block visits are spaced out with the intention of covering every block in the 
constituency between elections. In Constituency S, block visits are done with the 
Member of Parliament, but at irregular intervals. Emails will be sent to various 
agencies, namely the commander of the Police Centre located in the constituency, 
the Town Council, Housing and Development Branch, the Senior Constituency 
Manager of the Community Club, the Chairperson of the Residents’ Committee in 
which the blocks are located, and a small number of about five volunteers from the 
PAP branch.  
 Each block visit takes about three hours, with an average of either two large 
blocks or three smaller blocks covered. Volunteers and representatives from the 
various agencies meet at the void deck of the first block to be visited in the evening, 
usually after dinner time at 7.30pm. A quick discussion on the sequence of visits is 
held and “front-runners” are given instructions to be polite, and not to knock on doors 
too quickly as the residents will then have to wait for some time before the Member 
of Parliament arrives to greet them. Block visits can be conceptualized as the most 
penetrative of capillary power conduits, where grassroots leaders, the Member of 
Parliament together with agents from the Town Council, Housing and Development 
Board branch and the Neighborhood Police Center knock on the door of the 
Resident’s private space, and request for visual inspection of the home. Deviations 
from the norm – such as single home owner without a family, a couple without 
children, a home without utility supply, or elderly residents without care-takers are 
noted by the agents of normalization, and referred to relevant agencies. The act of 
opening the door, and welcoming the Member of Parliament with a handshake and 
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engaging in small banter is an enunciative event, reinforcing and emphasizing the 
power relations that all are subjected to. One must however also realize that while 
residents are subjected to inspection, it is also true that some benefit from such 
inspections, such as being referred to voluntary welfare organizations, or be given 
aid in terms of food rations and cash which are much-needed assistance. 
Surveillance is not a one-way street, and compliance is had most often due to mutual 
benefits. Many of the needy are in dire straits and might be ignorant of available help. 
Visits by grassroots leaders and the Member of Parliament will be welcomed and 
surveillance succeeding because of mutual collaboration.  
Block visits are tangible events that connect grassroots leaders with the local 
political branch, and serve to make vague the distinction between grassroots and 
politics. The Member of Parliament as Advisor to the grassroots organizations wears 
two hats, which is made explicit in specific contexts – Advisor in grassroots events, 
and Member of Parliament during Meet-the-People Sessions 31 . There is close 
connection between the grassroots network and the political network in Constituency 
S, and an event that I have chosen to highlight to show this close connection is that 
of the management of utility bill arrears.  
5.2.4 Meet-The-People-Sessions and Utility Bill Arrears  
Besides shelter, water, gas and electricity (utilities) are necessities for a 
minimum standard of living. While utilities are accessible to all in Singapore as 
indicated in the 2005 Human Development Report, it does not translate to universal 
affordability. There is a group of people who accumulate significant amounts of utility 
bill arrears. Little information is available with regards to the size of the population 
owing utility arrears, but an article published in 2004 reported that on average, about 
                                                 
31 Meet-the-People Sessions are held weekly where residents can approach their Member of Parliament 
for help.  
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3,000 homes every month are without power because of arrears (Straits Times 28 
September 2004). While causal factors behind the accumulation of large utility bill 
arrears are complex and multi-factoral, it is hypothesized that economic hardship 
(either due to unemployment or low-paying jobs) is one significant factor. This group 
of consumers can be understood as the Poor and includes Low Wage Workers who 
do not earn enough for the reproduction of labor on an everyday basis32.  
Without adequate financial resources, arrears accumulate and the Poor find 
themselves in a situation of distress with no gas to cook meals, water for daily 
washing and electricity for lighting at night. If there are no networks of social support 
to fall on, the Poor turn to their Member of Parliament as well as social institutions 
such as the CDC and Community Centre for assistance. How utility bill arrears are 
dealt with provides a neat case study on the microphysics of power where the 
workings of pastoral welfarism are clearly exemplified. The changed treatment of 
arrears, from allowing its accumulation, to enforcement of installment plans, to 
provision of utility vouchers to the implementation of the Pay As You Use (PAYU) 
Scheme shows the changing relations of power between the various normalizing 
agents, as well as the fine-tuned disciplining of the Poor. The Poor is caught in 
power relations, positioned to be trained, corrected and controlled. Power generates 
a multiplicity of effects, including the decision to comply with “requirements” such as 
regular installment payments and the active seeking of employment. Minor coercive 
techniques to get the Poor to comply include house visits, letters of reminders and 
                                                 
32 The non-payment of bills including utility bills causing an accumulation of arrears represents the 
inability to cope with expenses incurred. While it is acknowledged that the owing of arrears 
encompasses all types of Poor such as the destitute and temporarily Poor; that not all Low Wage 
Workers owe utility bill arrears; and not all who owe arrears are Low Wage Workers, it is nonetheless 
plausible to suggest that with financial difficulties, arrears constitute a very real characteristic of Low 
Wage Workers. Newspaper reports on utility arrears mention Low Wage Workers such as a former air 
con mechanic who was working on a part-time basis and whose earnings was insufficient to support his 
family (Straits Times 28 September 2004). It is thus fruitful to examine the management of arrears as 
the management of the Poor which includes Low Wage Workers who owe arrears.  
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eventual disconnection of utility supply. They aim at normalization and the creation of 
docile Bodies, directing individual conduct through such normalization processes.   
The Public Utilities Board was established in May 1963 through which the 
state controlled power generation, distribution and retailing, piped-gas distribution as 
well as the provision of water. Since the formation of this Statutory Board, it has 
garnered worldwide recognition for its commercial viability and efficiency even as a 
state monopoly (Parliamentary Debates 1990:195, PUB Annual Report 1995). 
However in the 1980s, the Government decided that a competitive electrical market 
was necessary for the continued attractiveness of Singapore as a location for the 
energy-intensive semiconductor and chemical industries. As a first step towards the 
privatization of the local power industry, the electricity and gas undertakings of the 
Public Utilities Board were corporatized in 1995 to form Singapore Power. Since its 
incorporation, Singapore Power has progressed into a highly profitable business 
entity with investments in Australia, South Korea and Thailand. For the financial year 
ended 31 March 2005, Singapore Power and its subsidiaries reported a total revenue 
of S$5.5 billion, a net profit of S$861 million and total assets of S$20.1 billion. 
Currently it employs more than 3,400 people in the Asia-Pacific region 
(www.singaporepower.com.sg).  
Even as Singapore is ranked first by the Swiss-based World Competitiveness 
Report in 1995 for building a power supply which meets business requirements (PUB 
Annual Report, 1995:8), and even if it is reflected in the 2005 Human Development 
Index that there is “100% sustainable access to improved water source” in Singapore, 
the picture reflected in the everyday lives of the Poor is incongruent with these global 
accolades. They face mounting utility bill arrears and the real threat of the 
disconnection of their utilities supply. During the 2002 Parliamentary Debates, 
Opposition Member of Parliament Chaim See Tong asked then Minister for Trade 
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and Industry, George Yeo if he would “advise [Singapore Power] and the Public 
Utilities Board not to cut electricity and water supplies to customers who are in 
arrears of utility bills but to give them more time to pay up during times of economic 
difficulties” (31 October 2002). Yeo replied that the Ministry for Trade and Industry 
had been holding discussions with Singapore Power to extend the period for 
repayment rather than the preemptory disconnection of their utility supplies. In 
managing utility bill arrears, the market principle is paramount where Singapore 
Power must be profitably run to uphold the economic interests of their shareholders 
even as steps are made to help the genuinely needy. Yeo asserted in Parliament 
that 
As a commercial company, [Singapore Power] should recover arrears from its 
defaulting customers. However, they are aware that they should do this in a 
sensitive way especially from households who have genuine difficulties. For 
these households, if the need arise, [Singapore Power] will refer them to the 
Community Development Councils to access the Government’s financial 
assistance schemes. 
(Parliamentary Debates, 2002:207) 
 
Explaining how utility arrears are handled, Yeo stated in Parliament (31 
October 2001) that reminders are issued and visits made to these households to 
work out the best way to resolve the outstanding arrears. If a consumer informs SP 
Services33 of his or her inability to pay, SP Services will then advice him or her to 
make alternative payment arrangements. This is usually done through a letter of 
appeal from his or her constituency’s Member of Parliament, requesting that SP 
Services accept an installment plan to manage the outstanding arrears. The back 
payments may be repaid via an installment plan but the customers must pay off their 
current bill to prevent the arrears from spiraling out of control. Addressing the 
concern of disconnection, Yeo replies that the “disconnection of utilities supply is a 
last resort action taken by Singapore Power. This can be avoided if households 
                                                 
33 The arm of Singapore Power that manages billing.  
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contact [Singapore Power] and jointly work out a viable repayment arrangement” 
(Parliamentary Debates 31 October 2002).  
In addressing utility bill arrears, the Government’s policy is to help consumers 
manage arrears through financial aid and installment plans. Financial schemes are 
administered by the CDCs, and selective targeting through stringent eligibility criteria 
is employed to identify the genuinely needy. For example, the Rent and Utilities 
Assistance Scheme (RUAS) provides short-term relief for those who are unable to 
pay their rent and utility bills. This scheme 
provides short-term relief to Singaporean Citizens and Permanent Residents 
staying in one, two or three-room HDB rental flats who are genuinely unable 
to pay their rent/utilities/conservancy charges, The scheme also assists these 
families experiencing hardship to move towards self-sufficiency.  
(Handout given in Dialogue with Prime Minister, 9 September 2003 emphasis 
added) 
 
In the first half of 2002, a total of $340,000 was disbursed to more than 600 
applicants under the RUAS (Yeo 31 October 2002). In addition to these financial 
schemes, over 73,000 households paid their arrears through monthly installment 
plans (Ibid.). It can be seen that in 2002, aid provided is emphasized as being 
temporary, geared towards “normalization” of the recipient to be self-sufficient. 
Disconnection represents the last effort of coercion by the state to discipline the body, 
depriving it of the fundamental requirements of everyday reproduction of labor – 
water, gas and electricity. The Poor as consumers of utilities is open to influence 
from multiple agents of normalization.  
However, interviews with grassroots organizations reveal that the phone or 
house call as described by Yeo is not strictly followed. Most do not receive calls or 
house visits from SP Services even though they have not paid their bills for over six 
months. Monthly red-colored bills warning of accumulating arrears and the possibility 
of disconnection. In addition, except for a telephone number for SP Services’ Debt 
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Management department, no offers of alternative payments are listed on the bills. 
Disconnection is done by geographical area and every month staff from SP Services 
are dispatched to different areas to disconnect the utility supplies of defaulting 
customers who have yet to arrange payment plans. Two weeks before staff are 
dispatched to the chosen area, a letter warning of impending disconnection is sent to 
consumers who have not made any efforts to contact SP Services. Thus the 
disciplining effect relies on the Poor’s voluntary visit to the CDC or Singapore Power, 
or the Member of Parliament who presents him or her with a Utilities Voucher, and 
writes letters to request for an installment plan to manage the arrears. Recently in 21 
April 2005, a new scheme was introduced to deal with installment defaulters, called 
the Pay As You Use (PAYU) Scheme.  
As described,  
The scheme provides an option for HDB residential customers, whose 
electricity supply has been disconnected due to arrears, to have their supply 
reconnected while offering them the flexibility to settle their arrears over time. 
Participation is voluntary and customers with significant arrears can now 
better manage their electricity consumption in line with their ability to pay. 
(Joint press statement by SP Services and the Energy Market Authority of Singapore, 
21 April 2005) 
 
This scheme targets those whose utility supply has been disconnected, have 
defaulted on at least two installment plans and are unable to pay the amount 
required for reconnection. A “smart key-operated meter” will be installed without cost 
and will replace conventional meter, and the recipient will be issued a “smart key” 
that is pre-credited with $5 to help start the scheme. There is also an emergency 
credit of $3 that may be used when the credit falls below $1. This avoids disruption of 
supply, as well as time for the recipient to add credit to the key34.  Replenishing the 
credit on the key is done at post offices as well as SP Services Customer Service 
Centres and during every trip to top up credit in the key, 20% of the top-up amount 
                                                 
34 The emergency credit used will be deducted at the next top-up. 
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will be deducted to pay for the arrears and 80% credited on the smart key for use. A 
display on the meter allows the recipient to monitor the credit balance. I contend that 
the PAYU Scheme is an “improvement” in the management of utility arrears, 
launched to manage the presence the Poor who owe large arrears, of which the Low 
Wage Worker belongs. This scheme represents the state’s individualizing practice, 
where there is increased flexibility in management of the Poor.  
Weekly Meet-the-People sessions at Constituency S sees many cases of the 
Poor (in the subject position of Needy Residents) owing utility arrears. As such cases 
are common, a standardized form has been created. Volunteers fill in the form as 
they interview the Needy Resident, and they dispatch this form to a typing room 
staffed by volunteers who then transfer the information into a properly typed letter to 
be sent to SP Services’ headquarters the next day. Respondents comment that in 
the early 2000s, there were many cases where Needy Residents accumulated utility 
bill arrears of over $3000 and approached the Member of Parliament for help only as 
a last resort when they receive a letter informing them of impending disconnection or 
after their utility supplies have been cut off. These Needy Residents are most often 
Low Wage Workers who face financial difficulties and accrue outstanding arrears to 
amounts that are well beyond their means.  
Volunteers at Meet-the-People Session in Constituency S collect information 
such as the amount of arrears owed, the date of disconnection of utility supply, and 
the reasons to support the application for an installment plan to manage the arrears. 
Between July 2004 and March 2005, those who seeked help after their supply has 
been disconnected were given vouchers called “utility vouchers”, usually amounting 
to $30 after they agree to an installment plan which covers the fee for reconnection 
of utility supply. Those who qualify for vouchers will be asked to follow the volunteer 
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where the Member of Parliament will hand the vouchers personally to the Needy 
Resident.  
Grassroots leaders interviewed mentioned that in their block visits to sell 
tickets or spread campaign messages, they keep their eyes out for residents in 
distress. As one said 
There was once I told the [Citizens’ Consultative Committee] Welfare 
committee about this needy resident. I was selling lantern festival tickets with 
my committee people, and came across one flat with no lights on but a few 
candles. I knock door, asked what was wrong, and the resident who was the 
mother cried and said family got a lot of financial difficulties. The father was 
the sole breadwinner, got put in some drug centre for drug abuse. Mother 
cannot work because got four young children. Elderly grandmother working 
as cleaner… don’t earn enough to pay all the bills… So utility got cut off. I 
immediately called the Welfare Committee, tell them to send someone down 
to give food rations, and some cash for them to buy supplies. Then I tell the 
mother to go seek help from MP. I tell her, cannot live like this – very sad! 
Children in this kind of home will not be happy, mother also not happy… life is 
tough. So go MP, ask for help. Put children in childcare, then can work. At 
least got income to … start paying bills. Everyday open letter box see red 
letters from HDB, PUB, Town Council… very stressed!  
 
This quote shows the ability of grassroots organizations and its members to surface 
cases where unproductive bodies are disciplined. In the walking around of the 
neighborhood to sell tickets for events, surveillance of bodies takes place, and 
anomalies identified – in this case the lack of utilities. Information about the specific 
Body is recorded and this information immediately dispersed through a phone call to 
another grassroots leader from another committee who then pay another visit to 
further ascertain the level of help needed – from food rations to petty cash to 
directions as to where to get further assistance in terms of finding jobs and solutions 
to predicaments. Power is exercised through the knocking on the door to hail the 
resident from within the private sphere of the home, the gathering of information 
about the current state of affairs, the dispersing of this information to other 
grassroots leaders and the provision of food rations, money and advice. When this 
power is exerted, the Subject of the Needy Resident and Grassroots Leader is 
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created and the network between grassroots leaders reinforced. Nevertheless, it is 
pertinent to understand that power has a relational character and is a complex 
strategical situation. There is no simple relationship of dominated-and-domination, 
and no surveillance can succeed unless the observed collaborates. The benefits to 
the resident in the quote must not be neglected, and even if she is disciplined in the 
process, this is preferable to living without utilities.  
With the introduction of the PAYU Scheme in 21 April 2005 to replace utility 
vouchers, the help-seeking process has changed little. Grassroots leaders still 
continue their surveillance and examination for anomalies, and while help is still 
dispensed for dire cases of financial distress through the Citizens’ Consultative 
Committee Welfare fund, there is no longer the event of hailing where the Needy 
Resident shakes hands with the Member of Parliament to create the position of giver 
and recipient of aid. Letters are still written to request for installment plans, but 
instead of utility vouchers, the solution for the Needy Resident who defaults on his or 
her installment plan is the signing up for the PAYU scheme. Vouchers for the topping 
up of the smart key are available, but volunteers interviewed received little requests 
for such vouchers.  It is suggested that this is because the “smart key-operated 
meter” makes the Needy Resident visible to neighbors, and is an admittance of being 
in the Subject Position of the Poor.  
While the PAYU scheme is preferable to being without utilities, the flexibility 
provided in using whatever one can afford can be reinterpreted as “forced” self-
reliance, where there is coercion of the body to find work as there is no more option 
of allowing arrears to accumulate and having access to utilities. The everyday 
monitoring of credit left on the meter is a constant reminder of the Poor’s subject 
position, of the need to be self-reliant and live within one’s means. The state does 
not control less in the decision to stop the accumulation of huge arrears, but controls 
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better. Arrears affect the company’s overall profitability, and staff is needed to pay 
house visits and disconnect utility supply to homes. With the PAYU Scheme, chronic 
installment defaulters will be managed on a long-term basis, with the costs to the 
company a one-time installation of the meter. Its flexibility in allowing the User to pay 
for arrears and current usage is the individualizing practice - personal responsibility 
to live within one’s own means.  
However, when the Needy Resident is unable to pay for the reproduction of 
everyday life, one source of aid is the Citizen’ Consultative Committee ComCare 
Fund.  
5.2.5 Citizen’s Consultative Committee ComCare Fund 
 The Citizens’ Consultative Committee ComCare Fund or CCC ComCare 
Fund commenced on 1 July 2005, where every Citizen’s Consultative Committee 
was given $33,000 by the Government through the CDCs. This fund is directed at 
needy residents in every constituency, providing assistance in cash or in kind, or 
through the implementation of programs. Application for assistance can be done at 
the Community Centres, Community Clubs, and Resident’s Committees or by 
approaching any grassroots leader who will direct the resident to the appropriate 
channel. Grassroots leaders have attended talks arranged by CDCs in collaboration 
with the National Community Leadership Institute, which are usually held in the 
evenings at a Community Club. 
 All Citizen’s Consultative Committees have a welfare subcommittee, where 
members look after Needy Residents in the constituency. Monthly meetings require 
the declaration of monies spent, and the number of cases helped. In the three 
constituencies under study, most applications for ComCare are received at the 
Community Centre, and with referrals from the Member of Parliament’s weekly Meet-
the-People sessions. In both instances, a form has to be filled, which is attached as 
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Annex A. Citizen’s Consultative Committees are given the flexibility to decide if 
residents who apply for assistance are deserving of aid, and this is done with house 
visits done by Resident’s Committee Chairmen and their members, or by members 
of the Welfare Subcommittee. As described by a respondent interviewed at the Meet-
the-People Session,  
If a resident comes to ask us for help, we get him to fill in the application 
form… we can pass to [Assistant Branch Secretary] so he can pass to [Head 
of Welfare Subcommittee] who will look into the cases with his members, or 
we can decide to give to the [Residents’ Committee] chairmen of the 
residents immediately… by putting the forms in their pigeon holes in the CC 
[community club] and calling them. … We do not conduct the house visits, but 
the [Residents’ Committee] chairmen will do that, or else welfare 
subcommittee… At MPS we only fill in the form for the resident, and tell them 
that a grassroots leader will follow up with their case.  
 
Residents’ Committee Chairmen interviewed mention the time-consuming, 
normalizing and intrusive nature of house visits.  
I tell you, no joke! We cannot let the cases pile up, because some of them 
time sensitive, don’t help can die kind. No money, no food, no electricity, very 
cham35, you know? CDCs always being complained that they take too long to 
get back to residents, so we all have to work fast. I try to clear the cases by 
one to two weeks with the help of my [Residents’ Committee] members, we 
go there and see the home of the resident. Must take note if they have 
handphone, or if the TV big or small, how many children they have, what they 
spend their money on, if they have air con, or use fans, if they owe other 
people money, if anyone working, and if they really need help lah. Sometimes 
they bluff one you know? That’s why we go to their house to check them. 
Most of the time we will give lah, small sum such as $50, or else $300 if really 
jialat36.  I tell them, must find work, cannot on aircon all the time, must try to 
help themselves lah. Otherwise how can always want ComCare? We also die! 
Got budget you know? And cannot let them think money from [Citizen’s 
Consultative Committee] easy to get lah, wait they come [Community Club] or 
go MPS every week, then really jialat!  
 
House visits are usually done by Residents’ Committee chairpersons and one 
or two other Residents’ Committee members, with the exception of urgent cases 
which require the immediate attention of the Welfare Subcommittee which the 
Chairperson then makes the visit. At each visit, a form has to be carefully filled, and 
                                                 
35 Colloquial term loosely translated as being in a bad state.  
36 Colloquial term loosely translated as being in a more difficult state.  
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several details noted as mentioned by the respondent quoted above. The act of 
visiting the private spaces of residents may be conceptualized as the tentacles of the 
state extending into the most intimate sphere of activities for the Body. Grassroots 
leaders act as agents for normalization, and impart the ideology of self-reliance. 
Grassroots leaders inspect the home, and accumulate knowledge about the Working 
Poor, from the size of their televisions, to the total household income as supported 
by documents such as paychecks and income tax payments. They impart advice on 
how to keep costs of daily living low, such as not switching on air-cons, and 
switching off lights when not in use. If there are arrears involved with agencies such 
as the Housing and Development Board, SP Services (for utility bills) or the Town 
Council (for service and conservancy charges), recommendations will be made. 
House visits can be interpreted as an examination, as involving the normalizing gaze. 
Grassroots leaders living in the community acquire knowledge in every interaction 
with residents, and with regular events planned that entails door to door sale of 
tickets and advertising, surveillance is conveniently and constantly done. Through 
personal house visits, grassroots leaders acquire personal, detailed knowledge to 
decide if he or she “deserves” help according to established criteria interspersed with 
“local” knowledge about the “resident”. This is a fine-tuning of aid. 
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5.2.6 New Institutional Configuration: How ComCare Changed Past Welfare 
Procedure/ Normalization Process 
 
Before the implementation of the ComCare fund, our own constituency had 
our own Welfare fund to help the needy, with someone to coordinate from 
[Meet-the-People Session] side. They record those who seek financial 
assistance, who can’t pay their utility bills or facing problems managing their 
finances. … Our Constituency secretariat side issues cheques. … It was 
more informal before the ComCare, most of the cases were referred by the 
[Member of Parliament], and we just based on the resident’s outstanding bill, 
and we write a cheque to Singapore Power. … Now with ComCare, the 
cheque is still signed by Chairman and Treasurer of the Welfare 
Subcommittee. But the cheque will be sent to the [Meet-the-People Session 
Branch] and a letter will be sent to the resident by the Community Club staff 
to ask him or her to come down to our weekly [Meet-the-People Session] to 
collect the cheque… They do not collect at the Community Club because the 
Member of Parliament then can have mileage mah… Member of Parliament 
can hand over the cheque to the resident … and shake the hands. Before 
ComCare, the Member of Parliament was not involved at all in the 
disbursement of welfare aid. Just recommending to [Citizen’s Consultative 
Committee] only… No direct contact with resident at all until ComCare. 
 
The quote above shows the institutional reconfiguration of welfare. Before the 
discursive elaboration to pastoral welfarism as a new mode of social control, welfare 
disbursement was more informal and ad hoc. Needy Residents who approach 
grassroots leaders or the Meet-the-People Session helpers for aid are given help 
without exposure to numerous agents of normalization. If residents approached the 
Member of Parliament for help with their arrears, the Member of Parliament would 
refer the resident to the Citizen’s Consultative Committee. After a house visit (which 
is not compulsory), a cheque would be signed by the chairman of the Citizen’s 
Consultative Committee Welfare fund and sent straight to the agency where arrears 
are owed.  
As a result of the introduction of ComCare, there is a reworking of welfare 
arrangements. Previously more ad hoc and informal, the potential for welfare as a 
form of social control was minimal. While home visits were made, and grassroots 
leaders acted as agents of normalization in the process of acquiring information 
about the Needy Resident, there was no formal accumulation of information about 
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each resident who asked for welfare aid which tended to be a one-off “gift” to help 
residents cope with their bills. Normalization is minimal with such welfare 
disbursement arrangements, and technologies of the self are not encouraged when 
aid is not tied to work, or deliberate changes to the self. With the introduction of 
ComCare, residents who request for help are required to fill in a form at the Meet-
The-People Session or the Community Club. This form will then be given to the head 
of the Citizen’s Consultative Committee Welfare committee, who will distribute to the 
Residents’ Committee to do mandatory house visits, or in urgent cases the 
Chairperson or members of the welfare subcommittee will conduct visits within two 
days. Cases which require longer-term aid will be referred to the CDC as aid from 
the Citizen’s Consultative Committee is usually capped at an amount of $200 for 
three months. A proper report has to be filed, and recommendations made for a 
suitable amount of aid to be disbursed. The coercive potential of welfare is 
maximized by pegging aid to efforts at achieving the “normal’ – i.e. actively seeking 
employment to regain self-reliance.  
The tactics by which power is circulated among Subjects is numerous, from 
the mandatory house visits by grassroots leaders to the compulsory trip to the 
constituency’s Meet-the-People Session so that the Needy Resident can collect his 
or her cheque from the Member of Parliament. By making aid available only if the 
Needy Resident visits the local PAP branch during the weekly Meet-The-People 
Sessions, pastoral welfarism reigns at the microphysical level. A quote from an 
interview richly shows the importance of pastoral welfarism.  
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In the past, people uprise because they are the small group of people who 
feel the pinch. In the past they got no food, hunger triggered their riot. Now 
the economy change... you can’t sustain your family, and every time you 
open your letter box, all the bill come in, you can’t pay, and this group of 
people is maybe 10-20% which is a lot. It may increase, the people will start 
to wonder if the government is doing anything to help the poor. They cannot 
do anything to pull themselves out of the poverty trap, and it is a vicious cycle. 
Parents poor, children do badly in school, cannot focus to manage their 
children because they concerned with bread and butter. So in long term, the 
rich become richer, and the group of poor grow bigger, and then they can 
start another riot! The poor might ask, why the goodies also go to the rich, to 
the high income earner?  
 
This “updated” version of a peasant revolution is telling about the perceived 
importance of welfare as a new mode of social control. Residents in Constituency S 
and in Singapore who are not faring well in the capitalist system face accumulated 
arrears from various agencies such as utility bills with SP Services, service and 
conservancy charges with the Town Council, and also monthly loan repayments for 
their Housing and Development Board flats. The Low Wage Worker will be among 
this group of residents who will open their letter boxes, find their bills inside and 
worry about payment. Poverty restricts social mobility and pastoral welfarism serves 
to diffuse the frustrations of the Low Wage Worker, preventing a modern-day “riot”37.  
                                                 
37 It may be asked what are likely to happen to Low Wage Workers if they continue with the inability to 
pay for the various services. During the course of fieldwork, the downward spirals of accumulating debts 
were often seen, with several options taken. Installment plans break down, and some sell their flats 
(often at a loss) and rent from the open market to pay off mortgage loans, utility bills, conservancy 
charges, school fees and other miscellaneous debts. Other means of coping with debts include 
downgrading of their flats, approaching CDC for longer-term financial aid, moving in with relatives, or 
the simple surrender to despair and living from day to day. Most do pull through with the help of 




In order to have a concrete understanding of how power works in Singapore, 
a different approach has been attempted, one that emphasized a detailed analysis of 
networks and practices, combining both the microphysics as well as macrophysics of 
power. This thesis focused on three areas in its Foucauldian analysis of power – the 
recently introduced ComCare and Workfare initiatives for discourse analysis as both 
totalizing and individualizing techniques, as well as a detailed examination of 
grassroots organizations as examples of capillary power encouraging techniques of 
the self. Control conduits are currently being rearranged to allow for a more effective, 
more constant and more detailed operation of power which increases its effects while 
diminishing its economic and political cost. 
Singapore has often been cast as a small island nation with no natural 
resources but its people, and it is thus imperative for the government to have a close 
understanding and control of the Worker. The disciplining of the Worker and social 
body in general has been well-investigated, from works on social engineering 
(Clammer 2001, Mahizhnan 1998, Wilson 1978) or the interventionist state (Rodan 
2004, Neville 1996, Lim et al 1993). In the 1960s and 1970s with the beginnings of 
first import-substitution industrialization and later export-oriented industrialization, the 
Worker was a Working class body, exhorted to be “rugged” and “disciplined” and 
urged to pick up skills so that the body might be a productive body, contributing to 
macro economic development of the nation. The influence of unions was heavily 
curtailed, and the Worker was discursively understood as one to be inscribed with 
economic rationality. A discourse of economic survivalism and pragmatism pushed 
many disciplining policies, from the reduction of public holidays, to the increase in 
work hours, to the banning of long hair on men and the exhortation of smaller 
families.  
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The Middle Class Worker emerged in the 1980s and 1990s after years of 
macro economic development, and with this emergence the rise of the discourse of 
communitarianism.  However into the 2000s with structural unemployment, the 
Middle Class Worker was replaced with the Low Wage Worker as mentioned in 
Chapter Two and disciplining strategies changed to a discursive understanding of the 
body as self-reliant and “temporarily unproductive”. As a result of continuing 
diversification and reshaping of the economy to high-end manufacturing, there is 
increasing structural limits to social mobility, with current efforts at economic 
restructuring sharpening the difference in labor market rewards for the skilled and the 
unskilled.  The Low Wage Worker under pastoral welfarism is subjected to fine-tuned 
disciplining using newly created nodes of power at the level of the Worker’s lived 
reality, in the form of grassroots organizations with welfare responsibilities. 
Decentralization is initiated not to control less but to control better, where the 
tentacles of the state is extended down to the lived reality of the people. Policies in 
place also see the deprivation of the body of the Low Wage Worker, most aptly 
exampled by the Pay As You Use Scheme in the government’s effort to control 
seemingly rising numbers of bodies with utility arrears. 
In the name of ensuring continued economic progress, the state in Singapore 
has thoroughly penetrated and controlled society. The political legitimacy of the PAP 
has been described as having an economic base, where perceptible improvements 
in the material lives of the electorate has translated into continued political 
dominance. However, Singapore’s economic transformation over the years has been 
accompanied by increasing class stratification and greater awareness of relative 
poverty. Chapter Two elaborated in detail the growing ossification of class structure 
as indicated by the widening income gap, and showed that household income for the 
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middle percentiles of income groups have seen increases over the years in contrary 
to the decline for the bottom percentile.  
In his first May Day message after taking office in 2005, Lee exhorted the 
need for constant reinvention as Singapore faced three challenges of a more 
competition Asian environment with neighboring countries “playing aggressively” to 
attract global business; an ageing population with increased concern for financial 
security; and lastly structural unemployment as the economy continues to restructure 
itself (Straits Times, 1 May 2005). Challenges from economic volatility will change to 
social and political ones if nothing is done to preempt disenfranchisement among the 
growing group of Low Wage Workers. With the PAP’s economic base uncertain due 
to both cyclical and structural unemployment, an added complexity to continued 
political dominance is social change. It has been acknowledged that “Singaporeans 
were awakening politically and the level of debate and discourse was more 
sophisticated, and noticeably louder. … Political debate would be louder … even if it 
[the ruling PAP] retained political dominance” (Straits Times 13 January 2006). 
 With high literacy, greater general affluence and exposure to global issues 
and situations through travel or the media, there is an increasing call for greater say 
in running the affairs of the country and in shaping public policies (Straits Times 20 
January 2005). After Goh Chok Tong who is known for his consultative leadership, 
there were articulations of worry that asked if Lee Hsien Loong would return to the 
“harsher, more authoritarian style” of his father (Lee Kuan Yew) (Straits Times 10 
January 2004). I hypothesized that with the changing nature of the Singapore 
economy and society, we are seeing a change in micro power structures as amplified 
by modified channels of welfare disbursement. Greater involvement of grassroots 
organizations in welfare disbursement is conceptualized as the micro tactical shifts 
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complementing the macro strategical discursive elaboration from communitarian 
democracy to pastoral welfarism.  
 The rule for the tactical polyvalence of discourse allows us to make sense of 
this discursive elaboration from communitarian democracy to pastoral welfarism. 
There is no simple dominant/dominated relationship in discourse. Rather, discourses 
that transmit power and produce power relations are also potentially reversible. 
When the group of needy is no longer small but a sizable group of workers who are 
plugged into the capitalist system but do not receive in exchange monetary rewards 
that allows for adequate social reproduction, the continual variation of power is open 
to continuous modification and the potential for unrest and resistance is present. This 
discursive elaboration may be conceptualized as an attempt to deal with the potential 
for unrest and resistance from the Low Wage Workers. Table 1 summarizes the 
discursive elaboration that has been traced in this thesis.  
Table 6: Discursive Elaboration 























attention to leisure 
 
There are multiple subject positions created in the current discursive elaboration on 
pastoral welfarism – such as Grassroots Leader, Low Wage Worker and Resident - 
and these different subject positions involve particular politics and political 
investment. The tensions among the network of Grassroots Leaders have been 
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described in Chapter 5, where there is investment in their subject positions as 
normalizing agents, visiting residents who request for ComCare aid. Grassroots 
Leaders act as channels of capillary power of the state, penetrating into the most 
private space of the Worker – the home – gazing and examining the Worker, 
collecting minute, detailed information to judge if the Worker is deserving of aid. This 
power relation represents the microphysics of power, where welfare is a normalizing 
tool to return the Worker to stable employment and self-sufficiency.  
Theoretically, Foucault appreciates the inevitability of power; he is critical of 
power but does not condemn its use. Thus the complexity in the writing of this thesis 
has been the intricacy of explicating a sociological phenomenon critically without 
simply “condemning” current networks of power relations but understand 
contradicting difficulties in governance. It must be acknowledged that assistance 
cannot be provided efficiently without greater knowledge. However, due to the 
power/knowledge nexus, greater knowledge allows for greater control. The PAP is 
introducing a form of controlled welfare to counter a potential political problem of a 
growing “underclass” increasingly disenchanted with the promise of class mobility. In 
the disbursing of welfare to the Low Wage Worker, the collection of detailed 
knowledge, the consolidation and rationalization of welfare schemes as well as the 
decentralization of channels for the disbursement of welfare to grassroots 
organizations combine to give the 2000s a new mode of social control, one that 
utilizes welfare and grassroots management to maintain the political dominance of 
the PAP, encapsulated by the term pastoral welfarism. 
Decentralization to the grassroots has thus allowed the arrangement of a 
mechanism of power that enabled the surveillance of the smallest events that occur 
in the state. A meticulous observation of detail and at the same time a political 
awareness of these small things for control of the population is emerging with a set 
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of techniques and a whole corpus of methods and knowledge to re-know and 
recapture the subject of the Worker. Disciplining will be derived from the use of 
simple instruments – retraining for Workfare initiatives, utility meters, block parties 
and visits, grassroots disbursement of ComCare aid, as well as normalizing 
judgments from agents such as Grassroots Leaders and Community Development 
Council staff which combines into an examination of the Low Wage Worker. This 
disciplining is a technique of power that sees the Low Wage Worker as both a 
subject, as well as an instrument of its exercise to maintain political dominance for 
the PAP in Singapore.  
Having traced the shifting strategies of political dominance from 
authoritarianism in the 1960s to current practices of pastoral welfarism, it might be 
apt to cogitate about the future of pastoral welfarism and the likely evolution of other 
forms of social penetration. While it is impossible to predict future events, several 
conjectures may be made. Increasing vocality of non-governmental organizations as 
well as changing expectations from the public for more consultative governance will 
continue to take place against the backdrop of continued economic volatility and 
restructuring. This social and economic climate will not allow the return to previous 
forms of social control, but rather encourage the continued use of pastoral welfarism. 
There will be the development of more forms of capillary power to penetrate the 
social body, where we may start to see professional full-time grassroots leaders 
employed by the People’s Association, or the creation of more grassroots 
organizations whose main function will be to dispense ComCare funds and maintain 
records of those who have accepted aid. This specialization will allow for the fine-
tuning of aid, which has both positive and negative consequences. While this means 
that ComCare funds will be used to greater effect and good, it will also mean the 
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accumulation of more knowledge of the Individual, translating to greater control due 
to the power/knowledge nexus.  
vii 









Appendix B: List of Events Attended in One-Year Ethnographic Study of Constituency S XI
January February March April May June
Tue 1 CNY Meet Tue 1
Wed 2 Wed 2 Wed 1
Thur 3 Blk Visit Thur 3 Thur 2
Fri 4 Fri 4 Fri 1 Fri 3
Sat 1 Sa 5 Sat 5 Sa 2 Sa 4 Camp
Sun 2 Sun 6 Sun 6 Sun 3 Edusave Award Sun 1 Sun 5 Camp
Mon 3 MPS Mon 7 MPS Mon 7 MPS Mon 4 MPS Mon 2 Mon 6 MPS
Tue 4 Tue 8 Tue 8 Tue 5 Carnival Meet Tue 3 Tue 7
Wed 5 Wed 9 Wed 9 Transpt Meet Wed 6 Wed 4 Wed 8
Thur 6 Thur 10 Thur 10 Thur 7 Thur 5 Thur 9
Fri 7 CCC Meet Fri 11 Fri 11 Temple Dinner Fri 8 RC Meet Fri 6 RC Meet Fri 10
Sat 8 Sat 12 Sat 12 Sat 9 Sat 7 Sat 11 Farm Tour
Sun 9 CCC Award Sun 13 CNY Party Sun 13 Walkajog Sun 10 Sun 8 Sun 12
Mon 10 Golf Tour. Mon 14 MPS Mon 14 MPS Mon 11 MPS Mon 9 MPS Mon 13 MPS
Tue 11 Tue 15 Tue 15 Tue 12 Tue 10 Tue 14
Wed 12 Wed 16 Wed 16 Wed 13 Wed 11 Carnival Meet Wed 15
Thur 13 Thur 17 Thur 17 Thur 14 Transpt Meet Thur 12 PA Awards Thur 16
Fri 14 RC Meet Fri 18 Fri 18 RC Meet Fri 15 Fri 13 Fri 17 RC Meet
Sat 15 Sat 19 CNY Dinner Sat 19 Temple Dinner Sat 16 Sat 14 Sat 18
Sun 16 Sun 20 Sun 20 YEC Meet Sun 17 Hdbook Launch Sun 15 Sun 19
Mon 17 MPS Mon 21 MPS Mon 21 MPS Mon 18 MPS Mon 16 MPS Mon 20 MPS
Tue 18 Tue 22 Tue 22 Tue 19 Tue 17 Tue 21
Wed 19 Wed 23 Variety Show Wed 23 Wed 20 Wed 18 Wed 22
Thur 20 Thur 24 Thur 24 CCC Meet Thur 21 Thur 19 Thur 23
Fri 21 Fri 25 Fri 25 Fri 22 RC Meet Fri 20 CCC Meet Fri 24
Sa 22 Sa 26 Sa 26 Sa 23 Sa 21 Sa 25
Sun 23 Sun 27 Sun 27 Sun 24 Sun 22 Sun 26
Mon 24 MPS Mon 28 MPS Mon 28 MPS Mon 25 MPS Mon 23 Mon 27 MPS
Tue 25 PA Seminar Tue 29 Tue 26 Tue 24 Tue 28
Wed 26 Youth Meet Wed 30 Wed 27 Wed 25 Wed 29
Thur 27 Thur 31 Thur 28 Carnival Meet Thur 26 Thur 30 Blk Visit
Fri 28 IUP+ Meet Fri 29 Fri 27
Sat 29 Sat 30 Sat 28 Carnival 
Sun 30 Sun 29
Mon 31 MPS Mon 30 MPS
Tue 31
XII
July August Sept Oct Nov Dec
Mon 1 MPS
Tue 2 Tue 1
Wed 3 Wed 2
Thur 4 Thur 1 Temple Dinner Thur 3 Thur 1
Fri 1 Persuader S Fri 5 Fri 2 Fri 4 Fri 2
Sat 2 Sat 6 Sat 3 Sat 1 C. Day Party Sat 5 Party Awards Sat 3
Sun 3 Sun 7 Sun 4 Sun 2 Sun 6 Convention Sun 4 Baby Show
Mon 4 MPS Mon 8 MPS Mon 5 MPS Mon 3 MPS Mon 7 MPS Mon 5 MPS
Tue 5 Tue 9 Tue 6 Tue 4 Tue 8 Tue 6
Wed 6 Wed 10 Wed 7 Wed 5 YEC Meet Wed 9 Wed 7 YEC Meet
Thur 7 Thur 11 Thur 8 Thur 6 Thur 10 Thur 8
Fri 8 Fri 12 Fr 9 Temple Dinner Fri 7 Fri 11 Fri 9
Sat 9 RC Meet Sat 13 Sat 10 Sat 8 ComCare Talk Sat 12 Sat 10
Sun 10 Arts Event Sun 14 Sun 11 Sun 9 Sun 13 Temple Dinner Sun 11
Mon 11 MPS Mon 15 MPS Mon 12 MPS Mon 10 MPS Mon 14 MPS Mon 12 MPS
Tue 12 Tue 16 Tue 13 Tue 11 Tue 15 Tue 13
Wed 13 Wed 17 Wed 14 Dengue Meet Wed 12 Wed 16 Wed 14
Thur 14 YEC Meet Thur 18 Thur 15 Thur 13 Thur 17 Thur 15
Fri 15 Fri 19 Fri 16 Fri 14 Fri 18 Fri 16
Sat 16 Racial Harmony Sat 20 Sat 17 Lantern Fest Sat 15 Sat 19 Sat 17
Sun 17 Sun 21 Sun 18 Dengue Visit Sun 16 Sun 20 Temple Dinner Sun 18
Mon 18 MPS Mon 22 MPS Mon 19 MPS Mon 17 MPS Mon 21 MPS Mon 19 MPS
Tue 19 Tue 23 Tue 20 Dengue Visit Tue 18 Tue 22 Tue 20 CC Ani. Launch
Weddd 
20 Wed 24 Wed 21 YEC Meet Wed 19 Wed 23 Wed 21
Thur 21 Thur 25 Thur 22 Thur 20 Thur 24 Choral Fest Thur 22
Fri 22 RC Meet Fri 26 RC Meet Fri 23 RC Meet Fri 21 Fri 25 Fri 23
Sat 23 Sat 27 Sat 24 Sat 22 Sat 26 YP@DXO Sat 24
Sun 24 Sun 28 Sun 25 Sun 23 Blk Party Sun 27 Sun 25
Mon 25 MPS Mon 29 MPS Mon 26 MPS Mon 24 MPS Mon 28 MPS Mon 26 MPS
Tue 26 Tue 30 Tue 27 ComCare Meet Tue 25 Tue 29 Tue 27
Wed 27 Wed 31 Wed 28 Dengue Visit Wed 26 Wed 30 Wed 28
Thur 28 Thur 29 Thur 27 Thur 29
Fri 29 Fri 30 Fri 28 Fri 30
Sat 30 Sat 29 Sat 31











































- Thank you for agreeing to this interview, your identities will not be revealed at 
any stage. Pseudonyms will be used in the report. 
- To set the context of this interview, I would like to focus on one issue. I want 
to understand why you chose to become a Grassroots Leader, and how you 
see yourself as part of the grassroots network. 
 
Introduction 
- Ok, to start the whole interview going, can you tell me a little about yourself? 
o Where do you stay? 
o How many children do you have?  
o Do your children participate in grassroots activities too? 
o Which GROs do you volunteer with? 
o What positions do you hold? 
o What do you do in your spare time? 
 
Exploratory Questions 
- When did you join GROs? 
- How did you know about the GRO you first joined? 
- Why did you join RC/GROs? 
- What was your impression of GROs then? 
- What is your impression of GROs now? 
 
Reason for Participation 
- What are the ups and downs throughout your time with GROs? 
- What makes you want to put in so much time and effort into grassroots 
activities? 
- What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages in being a GRL? 








Relevance of GROs from GRL’s Perspective 
- Do residents recognize you in your neighborhood? 
- What role do you think GROs play in your neighborhood? 
- Do you think there is still a need for your GRO in the neighborhood? 
- Do you actively think about the broad aims PA has set out for GROs? 
 
GRO Regulation Matters 
- Is there a good mixture of races in your GROs? 
- Can you tell me briefly about the members in your committee? 
o Names 
o Occupation 
o Designation in GROs 
o Years of volunteering 
- What do you think of the new ruling by PA that the position of Chairman must 
be rotated after 3 terms? 
 
Details of Participation 
- Do you actively recruit younger volunteers? 
- What are the sorts of activities you organize in your GROs? 
o Which are the most important? 
- Have these activities changed over the years? 
- What do you think needs improving in how GROs are managed? 
- What can be done to improve GROs? 
- Among the various GROs, which do you think is the most important? Why? 
- Are there any trends that you see over the years? Eg. participants getting 
more, younger, more Chinese participation etc. 
 
Interacting with Government 
- When do you interact with the Advisor, your MP? 
- Are there any government agencies that you work with closely? 
- Are you part of any political party? 
- How many of your fellow GRLs are party members? 
o What is your opinion of this arrangement? 




- Tell me about the ranking system for your GRO.  
- What do you think of the ranking system? 
- Do you actively think about how to get your RC a better rank? Why? 
- What do you keep in mind when you organize any activities? 
 
Welfare system 
- Can you tell me what is Comcare and workfare? 
- What is your opinion about Comcare and workfare? 
- How have you been involved in the giving out of welfare to your residents? 
Has it changed over the years? 
- What else can grassroots do to help residents? Have we done enough?  
 








A committee within the Citizen’s Consultative 
Committee charged with managing 







The Citizens' Consultative Committees 
(CCCs) are the umbrella organisations of all 
grassroots organisations. They plan and lead 
grassroots activities at the constituency level, 
oversee community and welfare programmes, 
and serve as a feedback channel between 








The Civil Defence Executive Committees 
(CDECs) promote community awareness of 
Civil Defence and help maintain a competent 
civil defence capability in every constituency. 
They organise civil defence activities and 
exercises to educate and prepare residents to 
cope with emergencies so as to minimise 
sufferings and loss of lives and properties. 
They recruit Civil Defence Volunteers to 
assist in organising civil defence-related 











The Community Centre/Club 
Management Committees (CCMCs) help 
the PA to build, maintain and manage the 
community centre/clubs (CCs). They 
promote racial harmony and social 
cohesion through the various cultural, 
educational, recreational, sports, social 






The Constituency Sports Clubs (CSCs) foster 
community bonding through a wide array of 
sports activities and intra-district games for 
residents to participate and interact. The 
activities include mass walks, mass swims, 
constituency sports carnivals, racial harmony 
sports day, bowling, basketball, sepak takraw 







The Indian Activity Executive Committees 
(IAECs) organise educational, cultural, sports, 
social and recreational activities to promote 










The Malay Activity Executive Committees 
(MAECs) help promote greater Malay 
participation in the management and activities 
of the grassroots organisations. They 
organise cultural, educational, social, sports 
and recreational activities to promote 






In private housing estates, there are 
Neighbourhood Committees (NCs) to 
encourage active citizenry and thereby 
fostering strong community bonds. Like the 
RCs, the NCs also work with selected 
government agencies to improve the social 









The People's Association Youth Movement 
(PAYM) is Singapore's largest youth 
organisation with its youth groups, Youth 
Executive Committees (YECs), based at the 
CCs. The YECs cater to youths aged 
between 12 to 35. The YECs aim to promote 
social cohesiveness, national consciousness 
and patriotism among youths. They organise 
various activities to foster leadership qualities 
among youths and at the same time, promote 







The Residents' Committees (RCs) in public 
housing estates promote neighbourliness, 
racial harmony and community cohesiveness 
among the residents within their RC zones. 
Run by residents for residents, the RCs also 
work closely with other PA grassroots 
organisations like the CCCs and selected 
government agencies to improve the physical 







The Senior Citizens' Executive Committees 
(SCECs) manage the Senior Citizens' Clubs 
in the CCs and RCs. The SCECs plan and 
organise a wide array of activities and 
courses ranging from arts and culture, 
lifestyle pursuits, lifelong learning to sports 
and wellness programmes to enrich the life 
experiences of senior citizens. The clubs offer 
avenues for the senior citizens to pursue 
lifelong learning, and also stay healthy and 
active. 
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T-Net Club  
 
The eight T-Net Clubs organise creative 
learning programmes and sport activities for 
teenage boys and girls aged between 11 and 








The Women's Executive Committees (WECs) 
offer opportunities for women from all walks 
of life to meet, interact and enrich themselves 
through a diverse range of cultural and 
recreational activities, and community 
services. 
(Source: Compiled from www.pa.gov.sg) 
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